KPSGILL policy proposal · model legislation and litigation question
Parallel Certification Recognition Act
A private credential has become a condition of practice without ever having to say what it predicts. The proposal is narrow: bar the single-body condition, require published criteria, and leave licensure and initial certification alone.
The problem
Hospital privileges, payer networks and employment increasingly turn on continuing certification by a single family of boards. The underlying claim — that continuing certification predicts patient outcomes — has never been established at the strength the requirement implies. The result is a private credential operating as a licence: no public accountability, no meaningful alternative, and a recurring cost that falls hardest on the physicians with the least leverage.
Two features make this a policy problem rather than a grievance. First, the requirement is imposed by parties — hospitals and payers — that could state what they are actually trying to predict and generally do not. Second, federal competition authorities have themselves identified unnecessary provider recertification and accreditation requirements as a potential competition problem, which means the question is already live in the right forum.
The recommendation
Bar the single-body condition, and require recognition of any certification programme that meets published, outcome-relevant criteria. Initial certification and licensure — the two requirements with an evidentiary basis — are untouched.
§ 1. Findings. Continuing certification requirements imposed as a condition of privileges, network participation or employment operate as conditions of practice. Where such a requirement is not supported by evidence that it predicts patient outcomes, it restricts practice without a corresponding public benefit.
§ 2. Prohibition. A health facility, provider organisation, health care service plan or insurer shall not condition medical staff privileges, network participation, or employment on certification or continuing certification by a single named certifying body, or by a body designated by a single named organisation.
§ 3. Recognition. An entity subject to § 2 shall recognise any certification programme that (a) verifies initial specialty training through an accredited pathway, (b) publishes its standards and its appeal process, (c) requires ongoing professional activity relevant to the specialty, and (d) does not condition certification on the purchase of proprietary educational products.
§ 4. Statement of criteria. An entity that imposes any certification requirement shall publish the clinical or safety objective the requirement is intended to serve, and the basis for believing it does so.
§ 5. Preservation. Nothing in this article affects licensure, initial board certification, credentialing based on individual competence, or a facility’s authority to act on evidence concerning a specific licensee.
§ 6. Enforcement. A licensee aggrieved by a violation may bring an action for injunctive relief and costs. This article creates no cause of action against a certifying body.
§ 4 is the provision doing the real work. A requirement that must state what it is trying to predict tends either to be justified or to be withdrawn.
The litigation question, stated honestly
LITIGATION QUESTIONThe question. Whether conditioning privileges or network participation on a single body’s continuing-certification product, absent evidence that it predicts patient outcomes, is an unreasonable restraint of trade or an unlawful delegation of a public function to a private party.
Why it is not yet a case
A plaintiff needs demonstrated exclusion, a defined market, and evidence that the requirement lacks outcome justification. The first two are ordinarily provable; the third is where a case is won or lost.
Evidence that would be needed
Institution-level privileging criteria and their stated basis; the certifying body’s own outcome evidence; documented denials of privileges or network participation turning on continuing certification alone.
Why legislation is the better first instrument
A statute requiring published criteria produces, as a by-product, exactly the record a later case would need. The drafted § 4 is worth more than a speculative complaint.
What this analysis is not
Not advice, not a solicitation, and not a prediction of outcome. It is a statement of what a responsible case would require.
The strongest arguments against
- Multiple certifying bodies confuse patients and hospitals.
- A recognition standard invites a race to the least rigorous credential.
- Certification is voluntary; nobody is compelled.
- Hospitals need one bright line for privileging.
- This is a physician self-interest argument dressed as policy.
Answers
- Confusion is answered by disclosure. It has never been a reason to license one private provider of anything.
- Which is why § 3 runs to published, outcome-relevant criteria, not to any body that applies. The floor is the point.
- A credential that determines whether a physician may work is not voluntary in any sense the word ordinarily carries.
- A bright line drawn around one private product is a delegation of public authority to a private party. § 4 lets an institution keep a bright line it can justify.
- It is partly a physician-interest argument, and saying so does not answer it. The patient-facing claim is narrow and stated as such: nothing here weakens licensure or initial certification, which are the requirements with evidence behind them.
Metrics, sunset, open questions
Metrics. Number of institutions publishing outcome-relevant privileging criteria; physician time and cost per certification cycle; whether a second programme achieves durable recognition rather than nominal acceptance.
Sunset. Seven-year review. The recognition mechanism sunsets if a competitive market for continuing certification is demonstrably functioning — the objective is competition, not a permanent regulatory scheme.
Open questions. Who evaluates whether criteria are outcome-relevant, and on what record? Should the recognition duty reach federal programme participation, or stop at state-regulated payers and facilities?
Documentary baseline on this site: the certification and credentialing analyses in the library, including the superseded records preserved at their original addresses, and the enforcement layer where competition actions are recorded.