What Kind of Claim Might You Have?

Scope and warning#

The categories below are the ones this series covers. They are not exhaustive, and the order says nothing about strength or likelihood. A category is listed only so that a reader can find the roadmap that explains the law for it.

Several categories are marked in development. For those, this page states only the family of claim and its first hazard, with the governing statute where one can be stated without analysis. The full roadmap, when published, will set out elements, defendants, prerequisites, periods, evidence and defenses in the same format as the published pages. Nothing here should be read as a summary of what those pages will conclude.

Who this is for#

Anyone trying to work out which roadmaps to read first.

The decision tree#

Branch A: work and employment

Branch A in more detail

Discrimination and retaliation. FEHA and federal laws prohibit specified employment discrimination and retaliation, but respondent coverage, protected activity, elements and administrative routes differ. CRD identifies a five-employee threshold for FEHA discrimination and retaliation, while its prohibition on workplace harassment can apply to smaller workplaces; federal ADA and Title VII coverage generally begins at 15 employees for private employers (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12926, 12940; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)). California generally requires a timely CRD intake/complaint process; CRD directs employment complainants to submit an intake form within three years, followed by the appropriate right-to-sue process. The usual civil filing period is one year after a CRD right-to-sue notice, subject to statutory exceptions and tolling, including specific 2026 SB 477 mechanisms; an intake, investigation, appeal or mediation should never be assumed to extend a deadline automatically. A federal EEOC charge commonly has a 180-day period, extended to 300 days where a qualifying state/local enforcement law applies; the usual federal private-suit period after a right-to-sue notice is 90 days. A state CRD notice is not a substitute for federal notice. Under Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, substantial motivating factor and an employer's proven same-decision defense require separate liability-and-remedy analysis. Individual supervisors ordinarily are not FEHA discrimination or retaliation defendants under Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640 and Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, although individual harassers and some business-entity agents raise distinct questions; see Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group (2023) 15 Cal.5th 268 and Roadmap 003. This route does not decide whether a particular company was a covered employer or agent.

Whistleblower protection. California Labor Code § 1102.5 addresses specified protected disclosures or refusals to participate in conduct that would violate law; protected recipient, reasonable belief, retaliation and applicable burden allocation require separate analysis. Health and Safety Code § 1278.5 applies to defined health facilities and persons protected by its text; § 1278.5(j) expressly excludes specified incarcerated patients, and it has not been established that an ordinary county-jail medical unit is a covered health facility. The 2025 Ryan v. County of Los Angeles opinion allowed a § 1278.5 claim against a county operating a hospital but did not decide county-jail status. Business and Professions Code § 2056 describes protected physician advocacy for medically appropriate patient care while preserving legitimate peer- and utilization-review mechanisms; its application does not turn every clinical dispute into actionable retaliation. These theories have distinct elements, proof rules, forums and time limits. Filing a FEHA or EEOC complaint alone should not be assumed to preserve a non-FEHA claim; see Roadmaps 019–023 and 030–031.

Leave. FMLA and CFRA protect eligible employees of covered employers for qualifying family or medical reasons, but the federal FMLA generally requires a covered private employer with at least 50 employees, 12 months of employment, 1,250 hours of prior-year service and 50 employees within 75 miles of the worksite; public-employer coverage and eligibility can differ. The California CFRA employer threshold is generally five employees, with its own employee eligibility and broader family-member categories (29 U.S.C. §§ 2611–2612; Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2). Pregnancy disability, ADA/FEHA accommodations and workers' compensation can add distinct rights. A medical note alone does not establish which entitlement, accommodation or employer duty was triggered.

Wages and benefits. Unpaid wages can raise Labor Commissioner, court, statutory or contract routes (Cal. Lab. Code § 98); identifying the wage employer under Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 does not automatically identify the FEHA or § 1983 defendant. Retirement, insured benefits and deferred-compensation arrangements require classification under the actual documents. ERISA governs many employer benefit plans and has a civil enforcement section, but not every compensation promise or nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement carries the same ERISA remedies: qualifying unfunded "top-hat" plans have statutory exemptions from certain ERISA participation, funding, vesting and fiduciary provisions while potentially retaining enforcement rights (29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1), 1132). A Chapter 11 case may affect debtor obligations, but a claim's bankruptcy classification, scheduled status, bar date, administrative priority and plan treatment must be checked against the actual orders and contract terms, not inferred from the payment label.

Arbitration. A written agreement to arbitrate is generally enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 2) (Grade: Settled.), subject to generally applicable contract defenses. An arbitration agreement does not change what the law requires to be proved, but it changes where and how the claim is decided, and it can affect which claims may be brought on a representative basis. The arbitration roadmap is in development.

Clinical independence. California BPC §§ 2052 and 2400 restrict unlicensed practice and lay control over physicians' professional judgment; recognized physician-owned medical corporations and other statutory arrangements make a blanket "corporations cannot practice medicine" statement inaccurate. The Medical Board identifies treatment, referrals, clinical staffing decisions and certain administrative controls affecting patient care as physician-reserved decisions. A management-services contract or shared brand, without evidence of actual control, does not itself prove unlawful corporate practice. Whether facts support a private cause of action, professional discipline or another remedy is a separate legal question (Roadmaps 030–031).

Branch B: medical care in custody

Branch B in more detail

Two claims from one event. A patient-care event may implicate medical professional negligence and federal constitutional wrongdoing, but neither follows automatically from poor clinical outcomes. Professional negligence focuses on applicable duty, breach and causation; when California Code Civ. Proc. §§ 340.5 and 364 apply, the statute-specific clock and prefiling notice rules must be analyzed. A § 1983 medical-care claim also requires action under color of state law and a constitutional deprivation; the mental-state standard depends materially on whether the person was convicted or held pretrial. Negligence or a simple treatment disagreement alone does not establish the Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference standard (Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2004)). Roadmap 044 compares these distinct inquiries.

Status decides the standard. For a convicted prisoner, an Eighth Amendment medical-care claim ordinarily requires awareness and disregard of an excessive risk (Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). For a pretrial detainee, Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2018), supplies a Fourteenth Amendment objective deliberate-indifference framework, which includes an objectively substantial risk, unreasonable failure to respond and resulting injury; mere negligence remains insufficient. A delay theory requires evidence of caused harm, not only elapsed time (Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006)). The person's legal custody status at the relevant time, actual risk, available response, medical causation and evidence must be documented independently. Roadmaps 041, 042 and 043 analyze those distinctions.

Who may be liable. In West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988), the Supreme Court treated a physician fulfilling a state-contracted prison-treatment function as acting under color of state law; the holding depends on the delegated governmental function, not simply an employer's corporate name. Individual liability requires the particular clinician's own actionable conduct. A county or qualifying private contractor does not incur § 1983 Monell liability merely because an employee erred: the plaintiff must connect a qualifying policy, custom, final-policymaker decision or deliberately indifferent training failure to the constitutional injury (Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2012)). Staffing data may be evidence, but understaffing alone is not an automatic finding of deliberate indifference or corporate policy. See Roadmaps 045 through 050.

Exhaustion. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a person who qualifies as a prisoner when a federal action about prison conditions is brought generally must first exhaust available administrative remedies, following applicable grievance rules (Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006)). The rule does not require use of a remedy that is effectively unavailable under Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016). Filing status, whether the suit concerns prison conditions, facility grievance procedures, proof of each grievance step, and obstruction or unavailability must be established. A former detainee filing after release, a state negligence claimant, or a licensing-board informant cannot automatically be treated as presenting the same PLRA exhaustion issue.

Disability in custody. Title II of the ADA applies to public entities' covered services, programs and activities (42 U.S.C. § 12132); § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires an appropriate federal-funding and recipient analysis (29 U.S.C. § 794). Disability-based denial of meaningful program access or reasonable modification is not the same thing as inadequate medical judgment. Identify the alleged disability-based exclusion, requested modification, responsible public entity/recipient and the proper route. PLRA exhaustion can apply if the suit is a federal prison-conditions action filed by a prisoner, but neither statute turns every deficient medical treatment into a disability-discrimination claim.

Branch C: death in custody

Branch C in more detail

A death may implicate distinct wrongful-death, survival and constitutional theories; the legal holder, injury and respondent must be separated. California wrongful death generally belongs to statutorily designated survivors for their own loss (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60); a survival claim preserves eligible claims of the decedent through the legally authorized successor or representative (§ 377.30). A § 1983 claim is not automatically owned by every survivor; continuation and independent familial-association theories have different standing and elements. A California written government claim may be required for covered state-law damages theories against public entities and on the applicable six-month schedule, but Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), bars imposing a state notice-of-claim prerequisite on a federal § 1983 claim. Where medical professional negligence is alleged, analyze Code Civ. Proc. §§ 340.5 and 364 separately rather than imposing them on every death-related theory. Government Code § 818 limits punitive damages against a public entity, while individual federal punitive claims require separate proof (Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)). Roadmap 008 addresses the relevant clocks.

Branch D: regulators and records

Branch D in more detail

A licensing-board complaint asks a regulator to consider potential licensee misconduct; a complainant should provide accurate, lawfully obtained evidence and distinguish firsthand observations from inference. It is not a private damages lawsuit and ordinarily does not toll civil deadlines without a specific legal rule. California public-records requests target records held by covered agencies, subject to exemptions, privacy limits and statutory response procedures; their submission does not prove that any responsive record must be disclosed. County contracts, staffing and inspection documents may be relevant research leads, while hospital peer-review materials can receive statutory protections (Cal. Evid. Code § 1157) subject to scope and exceptions. See Roadmaps 049 and 050.

Branch E: across every branch

Branch E in more detail

Identity matters across branches because contracts, trade names, payroll entities, medical corporations and bankruptcy debtors may differ. A parent is not liable solely by owning a subsidiary (United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998); Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523); vicarious tort liability turns on actual relationship and scope of employment (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 requires particular nongovernmental corporate disclosures and additional citizenship disclosures in diversity cases; it is not a comprehensive ownership census or proof of employment. Preserve only records lawfully accessible and respect patient privacy, privilege and confidential third-party information. California generally does not recognize an independent tort of intentional spoliation under Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, yet destruction may produce sanctions or evidentiary consequences, including where Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) applies. Attorney referral, fee and retention rules differ by service type; review the concrete agreement rather than assuming all cases have identical contingency provisions (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6146, 6147, 6155).

Routes by reader#

Employees and clinicians usually begin in Branch A; incarcerated people and their families in Branches B and C. Many situations touch Branch E whatever the starting point. A person who reported a care or safety problem and then faced consequences will usually need Branch A for the retaliation, Branch B or C for the underlying care, and Branch D if a licensing or public-records route is relevant; the order in which to read them depends on which clock is shortest, which is why Roadmap 008 is listed in Branch E.

Evidence#

Records to obtain#

A safe starting set is the claimant's own notices, letters and envelopes; lawfully obtained employment and pay records; authenticated dates, grievance receipts and counsel correspondence. California Labor Code §§ 1198.5 and 226(b) supply different access rights and limits for qualifying personnel/payroll records. A patient's own medical-record access differs from records of other patients; a deceased person's estate, next of kin or purported representative must establish applicable authorization and privacy-law status before requesting or disclosing protected records (Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 123110; HIPAA, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(g), 164.524). Do not export workplace charts, inmate rosters, protected peer-review material or third-party records merely to build a case file. See 006 and 007.

Branch by branch, the additional records that tend to matter are: for Branch A, the offer letter, handbook, job description, evaluations, discipline, the written reasons given for the decision, and any arbitration agreement or release (Cal. Lab. Code § 432 gives a right to copies of signed documents) (Grade: Settled.); for Branch B, the booking record showing custody status, sick-call slips, medication administration records, outside-provider records and every grievance form and response; for Branch C, the death certificate, coroner's or medical examiner's report, any in-custody death review and the records of the decedent's final days; for Branch D, the contract between the county and the contractor, staffing and inspection reports and the agency's response to any records request.

CFMG/Wellpath-specific relevance#

For this series, company labels and the reported Wellpath Chapter 11 process must be treated as separate research questions. The inherited manuscript identifies a November 11, 2024 petition date and docket No. 24-90533, but the linked Epiq debtor-list and petition documents were inaccessible during this review; therefore the specific debtor roster, affiliations, bar-date orders and treatment of any particular entity or claim are not authenticated here. Verify the exact legal name, role, petition/plan history and claim category against court-filed documents before applying bankruptcy consequences. Roadmaps 003 and 004 set out the entity-evidence methodology.

The claim map must therefore be read together with a verified defendant and a verified procedural record. Section 362(a) generally stays specified prepetition proceedings or collection against an actual debtor, subject to statutory exceptions including governmental police/regulatory actions under § 362(b)(4); it does not automatically stay every claim against affiliates, clinicians or counties. The need to submit a proof of claim and the applicable deadline depend on the actual Chapter 11 order, schedules, status, notice and claim type—not simply whether an event predates a reported petition date. Section 524(e) distinguishes nondebtor liability from the discharge of a debtor, but separate injunctions or plan provisions must also be examined; no particular immunity or liability is determined here. Roadmap 008 provides procedural routing; the underlying court docket remains a required source for any case-specific statement.

Authorities and document-verification limits#

• Unverified docket lead (not authenticated in this run): reported petition date 11 November 2024, Epiq docket link here (external site), inaccessible during review.
• Unverified docket lead: alleged Notice of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case and debtor list (Epiq link (external site)); individual debtors and nondebtors not authenticated.
• Unverified docket lead: described modified bankruptcy notice, In re Wellpath Holdings, Inc., reportedly No. 24-90533 (same inaccessible Epiq link); its text, notice service and bar-date effect require court-docket authentication.
• Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
• Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2012)
• West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)
• Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)
• Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)
• Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2018)
• Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
• Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006)
• Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2004)
• City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)
• Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011)
• Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006)
• Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016)
• Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)
• Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)
• Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203
• Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411 (2011)
• Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95
• Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640
• Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158
• Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114
• Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35
• United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)
• Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523
• Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291
• Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983
• 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
• 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h)
• 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1), as applied by § 12117(a)
• 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)
• 42 U.S.C. § 12132
• 29 U.S.C. § 794
• 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
• 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)
• 9 U.S.C. § 2
• 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)
• 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(e), 1141(d)
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 818
• Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2 (source (external site))
• Cal. Gov. Code § 12926, subd. (d)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (j)(1), (3)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2
• Cal. Gov. Code § 12960, subd. (e)(5) (source (external site))
• Cal. Gov. Code § 12965, subd. (c)(1)(D)
• Cal. Gov. Code § 7920.000 et seq.
• Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5
• Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 364
• Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.30
• Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60
• Cal. Lab. Code § 98
• Cal. Lab. Code § 226, subd. (b)
• Cal. Lab. Code § 432
• Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5
• Cal. Lab. Code § 1198.5
• Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 123110
• Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1278.5
• Cal. Evid. Code § 1157
• Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2056
• Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2052, 2400
• Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6125
• Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146
• Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6147
• Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6155

Related roadmaps#

001, Start Here; every claim roadmap listed above.

What this page cannot do#

It cannot tell anyone which claim, if any, they have, or which to pursue. It is a reading list arranged by situation.