What five public orders in Overfield decide about CFMG’s money — and what they leave open

ECF 96: protective order granted to CFMG; no further financial discovery into its dealings with Wellpath

• Court U.S. District Court, E.D. Cal., No. 2:24-cv-0199 TLN AC; discovery referred to the magistrate judge under Local Rule 302(c)(1)
• Motion CFMG’s motion for a protective order, ECF 88 (filed 9 September 2026); joint statement ECF 95; taken under submission, ECF 90
• Pinpoints pp. 2–4
• Evidence class Signed order, public reproduction · Court disposition

Court disposition CFMG’s motion for a protective order is granted. Plaintiffs are not entitled to the additional discovery.V01

Court’s account On 31 August 2026 plaintiffs emailed CFMG that their financial expert wanted information about management-services fees CFMG paid to Wellpath LLC, to assess — in the words the order quotes from plaintiffs — whether the “fee-splitting arrangement” was “commensurate value for the services furnished” under Business and Professions Code § 650. The order cites ECF 95 at page 2 for that email. CFMG argued that its finances are relevant only to punitive damages and that plaintiffs already had what they needed for that purpose.V01

Party assertion To justify the request, plaintiffs asserted that CFMG’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Blair Lukasik, testified that Wellpath took undocumented “cash sweeps” from CFMG’s account, and argued that because it is unclear how much Wellpath took, neither plaintiffs nor their expert can tell whether CFMG operates at a profit or a loss. The order cites ECF 95 at page 13. The joint statement itself is summarised in module J95 below; the deposition transcript has not been read, and nothing quoted on this page is a quotation from it.V01

Court’s account The court was “unpersuaded.” It stated that it had already held that the financial dealings between Wellpath and CFMG are not relevant to the punitive-damages issue, and that plaintiffs already had the information needed to determine CFMG’s current financial status for that purpose.V01

ECF 95: the joint discovery statement — each side’s account, in its own words

• Document Joint Discovery Statement re: Discovery Dispute (Local Rule 251), covering CFMG’s motion for a protective order, ECF 88; hearing noticed for 21 October 2026 before Magistrate Judge Allison Claire
• Copy read The public, redacted filing, 15 pages, from the court’s CM/ECF system; text recovered by optical character recognition and checked page by page. Exhibits A–C (the 31 August email, the request, and an order in another case) are not in the copy read
• Evidence class Litigation advocacy filed on the public docket · Party assertion for every statement below

Defense position CFMG’s counsel (who also signed for Wellpath, LLC) states that CFMG has produced its tax returns for 2021 through 2025; “an unredacted Management Services Agreement (MSA), which includes the monthly payment percentage to Wellpath LLC for management services fees during the relevant years”; and that plaintiffs already hold consolidated financial information Wellpath provided before the bankruptcy. It argues that financial discovery for punitive damages is limited to net worth; that plaintiffs’ request is a “backdoor” into the finances of non-party Wellpath; that plaintiffs “have no claims relating to the fair market value of Wellpath’s management services and do not have standing to bring any such claims”; and, in a footnote, that a § 650 violation can lead to criminal prosecution, fines or licensing discipline but gives rise to no civil cause of action. It reports that claims against Wellpath LLC were discharged on 4 June 2025.V09

Defense position — another court The defense describes an order of 21 April 2026 in Smith v. California Forensic Medical Group, Inc., N.D. Cal. No. 5:21-cv-00421-EJD (the case this investigation indexes as Smith v. Santa Cruz County), as denying plaintiffs’ requests to compel CFMG–Wellpath management services agreements, “underlying agreement materials relating to management-fee payments or intercompany transfers,” and Rule 30(b)(6) testimony about those agreements, on proportionality grounds. That order is Exhibit C and has not been read here; its content is the defense’s description.V09

Plaintiffs’ account of testimony Plaintiffs’ section describes the deposition of Blair Lukasik, CFMG’s Rule 30(b)(6) designee on its financial condition from 2021 onward, with transcript page citations. In plaintiffs’ account: there is a bank account CFMG controls and bank accounts Wellpath controls (Tr. 15–16); Wellpath provides management services, handling things “simply administrative in nature, like accounting, finance, IT, HR” (Tr. 16); CFMG pays Wellpath 18 percent of its gross revenue, before costs (Tr. 22–23); CFMG has operated at a loss in every year of the management agreement; the fee was “recorded … on the books” but “[t]here was no cash that was ever exchanged for those charges,” and Wellpath “never forced CFMG to pay that expense” (Tr. 24); Wellpath nonetheless takes some money in “cash sweeps,” in amounts not documented, and the witness could not say how much or how their timing is determined (Tr. 24–27, 37–39, 44–45); unpaid fee amounts can carry over between years (Tr. 41–42); without the fee CFMG would show a profit (Tr. 45–48); and the witness did not know the cost of the services and did not think their value could feasibly be estimated (Tr. 48–50).V09

Plaintiffs’ argument Using CFMG’s 2021 return — with the revenue and net-income figures redacted in the public filing — plaintiffs state that CFMG paid a $48 million management fee that year and argue that, without it, CFMG would have shown a profit. They ask for the amounts CFMG actually pays Wellpath and any valuation of the fee, which they assert CFMG is “required to conduct by law.” This publication does not reconstruct redacted figures and does not adopt plaintiffs’ arithmetic.V09

A quoted phrase in plaintiffs’ section also says Wellpath handles “all medical needs for the company.” Lifted from its sentence — which goes on to describe administrative functions — that fragment cannot bear the weight of a claim that Wellpath practises medicine, and it is not relied on here.

ECF 72: plaintiffs’ motion to compel management-fee receipts denied

• Motion Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, ECF 69 (filed 27 August 2025); joint statement ECF 70
• Pinpoints pp. 2–5
• Evidence class Signed order, public reproduction · Court disposition

Court disposition The motion to compel is denied.V02

Court’s account Plaintiffs sought receipts for management-service fees CFMG paid to third parties, including the discharged defendant Wellpath, asserting that CFMG does not keep sufficient standalone financial records. Defendants called the request irrelevant and, in the order’s quotation of their argument, a “back-door attempt” to reach Wellpath’s records. The court agreed that CFMG’s financial status is relevant to punitive damages but found the receipts would offer only “a tenuous basis for conjecture.” It recorded CFMG’s representation that it had produced consolidated GAAP-audited financial statements, tax returns and other financial information, and that the tax returns detail the total management fees paid in each taxable year.V02V01

ECF 87: further Chapman deposition ordered; further Hole testimony on his termination refused — without prejudice

• Motions Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, ECF 79; defendants’ protective-order motion, ECF 82; joint statement ECF 84
• Pinpoints pp. 1, 3–6
• Evidence class Signed order, public reproduction · Court disposition

Court disposition Plaintiffs’ motion is granted as to a further deposition of Dr. Ross Chapman in Sacramento, and denied as to a further deposition of Heather Hole — without prejudice to renewal after Chapman’s further deposition. Defendants’ protective order is granted until and unless plaintiffs renew. No sanctions.V03

Court’s account The order describes Hole as a “CFMG employee” testifying as CFMG’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness about “the termination of defendant Ross Chapman’s employment with CFMG in August 2025.” Counsel had instructed her not to answer who terminated Chapman and why, invoking his state constitutional privacy right. The court found plaintiffs’ theory — that Chapman’s hiring and retention showed a cost-driven practice of substandard care — “undermined” by Chapman’s sworn testimony that his termination “was unrelated to treatment decisions regarding any CFMG patient,” noting plaintiffs cited no contrary evidence. Asking Hole the same question was, in the court’s words, “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.” The court added that Chapman might, at his further deposition, waive privacy or give information that “casts doubt” on his earlier account.V03

ECF 75: Chapman’s defense counsel permitted to withdraw after Wellpath ended defense and indemnification

• Judge Chief U.S. District Judge Troy L. Nunley
• Motion Unopposed motion to withdraw, ECF 73
• Pinpoint p. 2
• Evidence class Signed order, public reproduction · Court disposition

Court disposition The motion to withdraw is granted under California Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(b)(4).V04

Court’s account Counsel “was originally retained by Wellpath, Defendant’s employer”; after the bankruptcy, Wellpath terminated its defense and indemnification of Chapman; Chapman was told of his options, did not retain counsel himself, did not authorize continued representation and stopped communicating. (The order’s service address is not reproduced here.)V04

Analysis Two signed orders in the same case describe the same physician’s employer differently: ECF 75 calls Wellpath his employer; ECF 87 describes his employment and termination as CFMG’s. Neither order adjudicates employer identity, and this ledger records both descriptions rather than choosing between them.

ECF 33: the stipulated protective order approved, with the court’s sealing rules

• Instrument Order approving and incorporating the parties’ Stipulated Protective Order, ECF 31
• Pinpoints pp. 1–2
• Evidence class Signed order, public reproduction · Court disposition

Court disposition The stipulated protective order is approved. A confidential designation — including of deposition transcripts — does not by itself entitle a party to file under seal; sealing requires a written order under Local Rule 141. The parties may not modify the order without court approval.V05

Analysis This is why the series below stops where it does. The confidentiality terms themselves are in ECF 31, which this publication has not read. Testimony and financial records produced under that order are not public merely because a public order describes them, and this publication does not seek, receive or publish protected discovery.V05V10