The Remedies Matrix: What Each Forum Can Award, What It Cannot, and the Statutory Limits That Shape Recovery

Scope and warning#

The matrix states the law of remedies at the level this project's authorities have been opened. A targeted October 17, 2026 source check addressed federal remedies statutes, federal Supreme Court ERISA authority, and California statute reproductions; it does not establish that every proposition, later amendment, local rule, or adverse citation has been checked. Direct access to current California Legislative Counsel pages was blocked; California verification remains grade C rather than officially authenticated. Subsequent adverse-case-history research and professional signoff are OPEN. Nothing here states that any entity owes anything.

The remedies, category by category#

Back pay

What it is. The wages and benefits the plaintiff would have earned from the adverse action to judgment (or to the date reinstatement is offered or the plaintiff's employment would have ended for another reason), less what was earned in mitigation.

Claims and forums. FEHA (Gov. Code § 12965; superior court and federal court by supplemental jurisdiction); the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) incorporating Title VII employment remedies, including § 2000e-5(g); back pay and interest on back pay are excluded from the separate § 1981a compensatory/punitive cap); § 1102.5 (as tort damages); Tameny; the FMLA (29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i), AR-024-F06: lost "wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation"); § 98.7 retaliation (the Labor Commissioner may order reimbursement of lost wages); § 6310(b) ("reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits," AR-0961-S02); § 132a before the WCAB (Roadmap 037.1).

Who. The employee or former employee whose employment was affected.

Limits. A claimant must prove compensable wage loss; mitigation and offset rules vary by cause of action and available evidence. Under the FEHA mixed-motive framework in Harris v. City of Santa Monica, a proven same-decision defense can bar damages, back pay, and reinstatement while leaving possible declaratory/injunctive relief and fees; that FEHA holding is not a universal defense to unrelated claims. Under FMLA § 2617(a), recoverable wages/benefits or actual monetary losses, interest, and presumptive equal liquidated damages are subject to a limited defense requiring the employer to show both subjective good faith and objectively reasonable grounds to believe it did not violate the Act; if established, the court has discretion to reduce or deny liquidated damages. Traxler v. Multnomah County, 596 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010), requires a reasoned judicial decision on that defense rather than an unexplained refusal of liquidated damages. Loss periods and amounts remain evidentiary questions.

Front pay

What it is. Future lost earnings awarded in lieu of reinstatement where reinstatement is impracticable.

Claims and forums. FEHA; the ADA; Tameny; § 1102.5; the FMLA (as equitable relief). Court remedies rather than a unilateral damages award by an EEOC/CRD intake investigator. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001), holds that Title VII front pay in lieu of reinstatement is equitable relief outside the 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) compensatory/punitive cap; that conclusion applies within the statutory employment-remedies framework rather than placing every future loss outside the cap.

Limits. Prospective loss must be supported by admissible evidence about likely duration, mitigation, and the feasibility of reinstatement. Under Traxler v. Multnomah County, 596 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010), FMLA front pay, including whether to grant it and the amount, is for the court as equitable relief, not an automatic jury measure; conjectural lifetime wage projections can be rejected. Harris's FEHA same-decision limitation must not be mechanically transferred to a different statute, defendant, or causation standard.

Reinstatement

What it is. An order returning the employee to the position, or an equivalent one.

Claims and forums. FEHA; the ADA; the FMLA (§ 2617(a)(1)(B): "such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion"); § 98.7 (the Labor Commissioner may order it); § 6310(b); § 132a (the WCAB may order it); § 1102.5 as equitable relief; the EEOC and CRD through authorized conciliation/settlement, and, where applicable, agency-initiated court enforcement rather than an investigator's unilateral damages judgment.

Limits. Equitable and discretionary; impracticable where the relationship has broken down or the position no longer exists; not a remedy against a non-employer.

Compensatory damages

What it is. Money for the economic and non-economic losses the wrongful act caused.

Claims and forums. Court claims generally: FEHA, Tameny, § 1102.5, § 1278.5, § 2056, § 1983, negligence, malpractice, wrongful death, survival. Under ADA employment claims, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a permits specified compensatory and punitive relief subject to a combined, employer-size-dependent cap of $50,000/$100,000/$200,000/$300,000; statutory back pay, interest on back pay, and equitable relief under § 2000e-5(g) are excluded from that cap. Punitive relief is not awarded against a government respondent under § 1981a(b)(1). The proper statutory employer and employee-count evidence must be established, not inferred from a corporate name. The statutory combined cap covers specified future pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses plus punitive damages; § 1981a(b)(2) excludes back pay and interest on back pay, while Pollard excludes qualifying equitable front pay. Ordinary compensable past out-of-pocket pecuniary losses are not automatically assigned to the same future-loss cap. In a reasonable-accommodation case, § 1981a(a)(3) provides an important adverse defense: no § 1981a compensatory/punitive damages where the covered entity proves qualifying good-faith efforts in consultation with the person to identify and provide an effective reasonable accommodation; that defense does not itself excuse an established violation or necessarily defeat Title VII/ADA equitable relief. Agency investigators do not themselves enter court damages judgments; separate authorized conciliation, court enforcement, and statutory wage/retaliation remedies must be considered.

Limits. The § 1981a compensatory/punitive cap levels were checked against an available federal statutory reproduction (targeted grade B); applicability still depends on employer count and cause of action. Under MICRA, the noneconomic-damages limits below; under § 377.34, the survival limits below; under the PLRA, § 1997e(e)'s physical-injury requirement for a prisoner's claim for mental or emotional injury (AR-096-F04).

Emotional-distress damages

What it is. Non-economic compensatory damages for mental suffering.

Claims and forums. FEHA (uncapped); Tameny and § 1102.5 (as torts); § 1983 (subject to § 1997e(e) for prisoners); malpractice and negligence (subject to MICRA for professional negligence against health-care providers); the ADA (within the § 1981a caps). Not available for breach of contract, for wage claims, before the Labor Commissioner, the EEOC, the CRD, EDD, or the boards.

Limits. As above; in an ADA reasonable-accommodation case, § 1981a(a)(3) separately allows the respondent to contest § 1981a damages through evidence of genuine, consultative good-faith accommodation efforts. Documented meetings are evidence to evaluate, not conclusive proof of that statutory defense; the trier must evaluate the conduct and the actual search for an effective accommodation. The FMLA does not provide emotional-distress damages (§ 2617(a) enumerates its relief).

Punitive damages

What it is. Damages to punish and deter, beyond compensation.

Claims and forums. FEHA and qualifying California tort/statutory causes may support punitive damages only if their remedial scheme permits them and Civ. Code § 3294 is satisfied: oppression, fraud or malice proven by clear and convincing evidence, with the separate corporate authorization, ratification, or qualifying officer/director/managing-agent participation requirements. The availability of punitive damages under any pleaded § 1102.5 theory must be verified separately, not assumed from the statute's penalty provision. The ADA within the § 1981a caps. Section 1983 against individual defendants (Smith v. Wade, AR-C48, subsequent history pending) but not against a municipality (City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, AR-C73); whether against a private contractor is a distinct defendant-status and controlling-law question. For an ADA respondent, § 1981a(b)(1) requires proof of malice or reckless indifference to federally protected rights, bars punitive damages against government respondents, and the combined statutory cap plus any proven § 1981a(a)(3) reasonable-accommodation good-faith defense can further constrain recovery. Malpractice against a health-care provider only after leave under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.13 (not opened). Survival actions may include punitive damages the decedent could have recovered (§ 377.34(a), AR-065-S07). Not available for contract or wage claims, from any agency, or under the FMLA.

Limits. The constitutional limits on ratio and reprehensibility (State Farm v. Campbell, case-history not opened); the statutory limits above; the evidentiary standard. Under White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal.4th 563 (1999), a California corporate "managing agent" must exercise substantial discretionary authority over significant corporate policy: a supervisory title, ability to terminate subordinates, or high employee headcount alone does not prove that status. Identify the individual, the authority to set policy, and the corporate authorization/ratification evidence before forecasting employer punitive exposure.

Statutory penalties

What it is. Fixed or formula sums a statute imposes for a violation, payable to the worker, the state, or both.

Claims and forums. Waiting-time penalties under Lab. Code § 203 (up to thirty days' wages; AR-026-S04); wage-statement penalties under § 226(e) (not opened); record-access penalties of $750 under §§ 1198.5(k) and 226(f) (AR-033-S01–S02); § 1102.5(f)(1)'s civil penalty of up to $10,000 per employee per violation, awarded to the retaliated-against employee, with Labor Commissioner factors under § 1102.5(f)(2) (California statute reproduction; official 2026 text authentication still OPEN); PAGA civil penalties shared between the state and aggrieved employees (Roadmap 026.1); FMLA liquidated damages (§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii)); HIPAA civil money penalties payable to the government (not to the complainant); Cal/OSHA citations payable to the state.

Who. The recipient depends on the precise statute and operative version: some amounts go to the employee, some to the government, and some are allocated by statute. Section 1102.5(f)(1), specifically, names the retaliated-against employee as recipient. PAGA allocation must be matched to operative notice/date and the amended statute; do not assume all civil penalties are payable to the state.

Limits. The one-year limitation period for penalties (Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a); Pineda on § 203 when sought with wages, AR-026-C04); the good-faith-dispute defense to § 203 (8 C.C.R. § 13520, AR-026-R01).

Unpaid wages

What it is. The wages themselves.

Claims and forums. The Labor Commissioner (Lab. Code § 98); superior court (§§ 218, 218.5); federal court under the FLSA for federal minimum-wage and overtime claims with liquidated damages (29 U.S.C. § 216(b), not opened); as a claim in the bankruptcy of a debtor employer for pre-petition wages, with priority to the statutory extent (11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4), not opened).

Limits. Limitation periods by contract type and statute (Roadmap 026); the definition of "wages" (§ 200; Schachter); the bankruptcy treatment of pre-petition claims (Roadmap 091).

Interest

What it is. Prejudgment interest on wages and liquidated sums; post-judgment interest on judgments.

Claims and forums. Lab. Code § 218.6 (not opened) on wage claims; Civ. Code § 3287 (not opened) generally; the FMLA (§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(ii)); federal post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (not opened).

Attorney's fees

What it is. The prevailing party's reasonable fees, where a statute shifts them.

Claims and forums. FEHA (Gov. Code § 12965, to a prevailing plaintiff; to a prevailing defendant only where the action was frivolous — as read in AR-010-S07's register; confirm); § 1102.5(j) (as read; AR-023-S01); § 1198.5(l) and § 226(h) (injunctive actions; AR-033-S01–S02); § 218.5 (wage actions, with the asymmetry the statute provides; AR-026-S07); § 1194 (minimum wage and overtime; not opened); the FMLA (§ 2617(a)(3)); the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12205, not opened); § 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), AR-S922, R1 pending; prisoner awards limited by § 1997e(d), targeted statutory-text review on October 17, 2026); ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1132(g), not opened); PAGA (Lab. Code § 2699, AR-0261-S01); Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5 private-attorney-general fees (not opened); on an unsuccessful appeal from a Berman award, § 98.2(c) (AR-126-S01). Not available in malpractice absent contract or statute; not available from agencies except as conciliation terms.

Limits. Prevailing-party status; reasonableness; the asymmetries and prisoner limits noted.

Costs

What it is. Filing fees, service, deposition and other allowable costs to the prevailing party (Code Civ. Proc. § 1032 et seq.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); not opened).

Injunctive relief

What it is. An order requiring or forbidding conduct.

Claims and forums. FEHA and the ADA (reinstatement; policy changes); § 1198.5(l) and § 226(h) (compliance with records duties); § 1983 (prospective relief against continuing constitutional violations, subject to the PLRA's requirements that relief be narrowly drawn and no further than necessary, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, not opened); the Attorney General's enforcement actions (Roadmap 093); ERISA (§ 1132(a)(3)); Cal/OSHA abatement orders; OCR corrective-action plans; consent decrees in DOJ pattern-or-practice matters. An EEOC/CRD investigator is not a court issuing injunctions, but authorized agency-initiated enforcement litigation can obtain court-ordered injunctions; other agencies have their own specific statutory powers. Do not treat private conciliation, agency enforcement in court, and an administrative order as the same procedural route.

Limits. Equitable standards; standing to seek prospective relief requires a likelihood of future injury (a released detainee generally cannot seek injunctive relief about jail conditions — counsel question); the PLRA.

Declaratory relief

What it is. A judgment declaring the parties' rights.

Claims and forums. Courts, under Code Civ. Proc. § 1060 (not opened) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (not opened); ERISA (§ 1132(a)(1)(B): to "clarify his rights to future benefits"); FEHA (as part of the same-decision remedies under Harris).

Wrongful-death damages

What it is. The heirs' own losses from the death: the economic value of the decedent's support and services, and the non-economic loss of society, comfort and companionship (Code Civ. Proc. § 377.61, not opened; CACI 3921, not opened).

Who. The persons Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60 names (AR-065-S08).

Limits. No damages for the heirs' grief as such or for the decedent's pain (which belongs to the survival claim); MICRA's wrongful-death limit where the defendant is a health-care provider sued for professional negligence.

Survival damages

What it is. The decedent's own surviving claim, pursued by the authorized personal representative or successor. Under Code Civ. Proc. § 377.34(a), ordinarily recoverable damages are predeath losses (including eligible penalties and punitive damages) without pain, suffering, or disfigurement. Subdivision (b) creates a limited exception for an action granted § 36 preference before January 1, 2022 or filed from January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2025; a newly filed 2026 action does not automatically qualify. This reflects an accessible January 2026 statutory reproduction; direct California Legislative Counsel authentication and subsequent amendments remain to be checked.

Who. The personal representative or successor in interest (§ 377.30, AR-0961-S06).

Limits. As stated; MICRA where applicable.

Malpractice damages and MICRA

What it is. California professional-negligence economic damages are not numerically capped by Civ. Code § 3333.2, but qualifying noneconomic damages are limited according to the judgment, award, or settlement year and the statute's defined defendant categories. Section 3333.2(g) starts at $350,000 for non-death injury and $500,000 for wrongful death in 2023 and increases annually by $40,000 and $50,000, respectively, through 2033. For a qualifying 2026 resolution, the scheduled statutory amounts are $470,000 for injury and $650,000 for wrongful death, per applicable defendant category. The statute distinguishes qualifying health-care providers, health-care institutions and specifically unaffiliated independent providers/institutions; neither three automatically stackable caps nor one universal cap may be assumed. Defendant licensing, facility status, affiliations and professional-versus-ordinary-negligence characterization require evidence. California code reproduction consulted; October 2026 official authentication remains OPEN.

Limits. The caps; periodic payment of future damages over a threshold (Code Civ. Proc. § 667.7, not opened); the collateral-source rule's modification (Civ. Code § 3333.1, not opened); contingency-fee limits on counsel (Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146, AR-S912, R1 pre-checked).

ERISA remedies

What it is. The benefits due under the plan's terms, enforcement or clarification of rights (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)); "other appropriate equitable relief" (§ 1132(a)(3)); relief to the plan for fiduciary breach (§ 1132(a)(2), not opened); statutory penalties for failure to furnish documents or COBRA notices (§ 1132(c), not opened); fees (§ 1132(g), not opened).

Limits. ERISA generally does not provide the ordinary jury tort/punitive damages associated with a denied-benefits action, but "benefits only" is too narrow: § 1132(a)(3) can permit traditional equitable remedies including reformation, estoppel and a monetary surcharge for fiduciary breach on an appropriate showing of actual harm and causation (CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011)). Availability depends on plan coverage, fiduciary and defendant identity, equitable theory, the relationship between (a)(1)(B) and (a)(3), exhaustion and subsequent controlling law; no automatic surcharge is stated.

Administrative remedies

What it is. What an agency can do: investigate; find; conciliate; order (the Labor Commissioner's ODA; EDD's benefit determination; a Cal/OSHA citation); refer for prosecution; litigate in its own name.

Who. The complainant benefits from an ODA or a benefit determination directly; from a citation, a finding or a referral only indirectly.

Limits. Each agency's statutory authority, as Roadmap 096.1 states row by row.

Professional discipline and license restrictions

What it is. Public reprimand; probation with conditions; suspension; revocation; citation and fine; practice restrictions; required education or evaluation, imposed by a licensing board on a licensee (Roadmap 092; Bus. & Prof. Code § 2227, not opened; § 2761 for nurses, AR-0961-S09).

Who. The public, through the board; the complainant receives nothing but notice of the disposition.

Limits. Board jurisdiction is profession- and license-specific. Boards may impose authorized fines, cost recovery or other conditions, but ordinary private damages do not accrue to the complainant as a result of licensing discipline. Discipline may have relevance in later litigation; admissibility, preclusion and issue identity require separate analysis rather than a universal "no effect" assertion.

Agency corrective action

What it is. Corrective-action plans, resolution agreements, consent decrees, monitoring, and funding conditions imposed by regulators (OCR, DOJ, BSCC, CDPH for licensed facilities).

Who. The public; sometimes a class of affected persons under a decree.

Limits. No individual damages; the regulator's jurisdiction.

How remedies interact across forums#

The categories above are not additive. The same loss cannot be recovered twice, and several forums take account of what another forum has paid or could pay. Six interactions recur in the facts this project addresses.

Wages and benefits recovered in one forum reduce back pay in another. A worker who recovers unpaid wages before the Labor Commissioner and then proves wrongful termination in court does not recover the same wages twice; the court's back-pay award begins where the wage award ends. Unemployment-insurance benefits received during the back-pay period are treated differently by different courts and statutes, and whether they are deducted from a back-pay award is a counsel question that this page does not resolve; the EDD record of benefits paid (Toolkit 126.1) is the fact that must be in hand either way.

Workers' compensation benefits and civil damages. Where an injury is compensable under workers' compensation, the exclusivity rule bars civil damages for the injury itself (Roadmap 037.1), while FEHA, retaliation and Tameny claims proceed for the discrimination. Temporary-disability and permanent-disability benefits paid for the physical injury are not back pay for the discriminatory termination, but the periods overlap and the computation of lost earnings must account for what was paid and why. Under Labor Code § 132a, the additional compensation increase (subject to its statutory ceiling) is distinct from reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages/work benefits attributable to the discriminatory act. It is incorrect to describe reimbursable lost wages as capped by the compensation-increase ceiling. The relationship to FEHA relief requires case-specific mitigation, causation and duplication analysis, not an assumed automatic election.

Administrative findings and later litigation. A Labor Commissioner award not appealed becomes a judgment (Lab. Code § 98.2(d)) and is enforceable as one; an appealed award is tried de novo. An EDD determination has the limited effect Unemp. Ins. Code § 1960 gives it and does not establish the facts of a termination in a later case (Roadmap 027.2). A licensing-board determination and a civil judgment are distinct adjudications with different parties, issues and burdens. Neither automatically substitutes for proof in the other, but admissibility, statutory confidentiality, and possible issue-preclusion consequences cannot be resolved by a blanket rule that each has "no effect." An EEOC or CRD determination is not binding on a court.

Settlement structure. Settlements commonly allocate sums among wages (subject to withholding and reporting), non-wage damages, penalties and fees. The allocation has tax consequences that this project does not address and that a reader should take to a tax professional; it also has consequences for benefits reporting and, where a bankruptcy debtor is a party, for the plan's treatment of the claim. This page states only that the categories exist and that the allocation is not a formality.

Fees and the prisoner-litigation limits. Fee-shifting statutes make some claims economically viable that would otherwise not be; the FEHA, § 1102.5, FMLA, ADA, § 1983 and wage provisions listed above are the reason employment and civil-rights counsel take cases on contingency. For qualifying prisoner litigation, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) limits fee eligibility and the hourly rate (up to 150% of the CJA rate), may require up to 25% of a monetary judgment to be applied to fees, and generally caps the defendant-paid fee component for a damages judgment at 150% of the monetary judgment. Murphy v. Smith, 583 U.S. 220 (2018), construes the prisoner-contribution rule adversely to plaintiffs. Fee treatment for injunctions, mixed relief and released/nonprisoner plaintiffs requires a separate eligibility analysis; no universal dollar forecast follows.

Bankruptcy and the debtor's share. Where a judgment or settlement runs against a debtor entity for a pre-petition claim, the recovery is a claim in the bankruptcy and is paid as the plan provides, which may be a fraction of the face amount or, where the plan channels the claim to insurance, the insurer's payment within policy limits (Roadmap 091). Claims against nondebtors must be analyzed separately, but are not automatically unaffected: defendant identity, plan language, insurance arrangements, any valid injunction or release, jurisdiction and notice/consent may matter. The enforceability and scope of any specific Wellpath plan provision or a purported nonconsensual third-party release cannot be inferred from this matrix; bankruptcy counsel must review the operative orders and controlling Supreme Court law. The remedies matrix therefore cannot be read without the entity sheet (Worksheet 101) and the bankruptcy gate (Roadmap 096.1 Family L).

What the agencies and boards can and cannot award: a summary#

Because the question is asked so often, the answer is collected here in one place, from the rows of Roadmap 096.1.

• EEOC and CRD: the investigation/intake stage does not enter a plaintiff's court judgment for damages; an authorized agency conciliation, settlement, or court enforcement action may secure monetary and prospective relief within its statutory authority. Federal and California administrative exhaustion and right-to-sue rules are separate and must be checked individually.
• Labor Commissioner: wages, interest, statutory penalties, record-access penalties, and under § 98.7 reinstatement and lost wages; no emotional-distress or punitive damages; fees only on an unsuccessful appeal under § 98.2(c).
• EDD and CUIAB: benefits; corrected wage credits; nothing against the employer payable to the worker.
• WCAB: compensation benefits; § 132a increased compensation, reinstatement and lost wages within the statute; no civil damages.
• Licensing boards: discipline of the licensee; nothing to the complainant.
• Cal/OSHA: citations and penalties payable to the state; abatement; nothing to the worker (the § 6310 remedy is the Labor Commissioner's).
• HHS OCR, DOJ, BSCC, county oversight bodies: jurisdiction-specific findings, resolution agreements, corrective action, or litigation may be available; private compensation cannot be assumed from an administrative complaint and must be traced to the particular statute and judicial/settlement route.
• Bankruptcy court: distributions on allowed claims as the plan provides; enforcement of the plan's injunctions; no new damages.

Two further cautions belong here. First, negotiated administrative resolutions can include relief that an individual intake investigator cannot unilaterally decree; do not confuse investigative power, voluntary conciliation, authorized agency litigation, and judicial orders. Agency litigation may produce court-ordered relief rather than a merely voluntary settlement. Second, an agency's inability to award damages does not make its process pointless for a reader who wants damages; for FEHA and ADA claims the agency step is mandatory, and the position statement the employer files there is often the first written statement of the reason that the later damages case will test (Roadmap 036).

A reader seeking civil damages may need a court or a statutory wage/retaliation forum, while EDD benefit determinations, WCAB compensation, ERISA plan benefits, settlement, and enforcement actions have distinct payment routes. A reader seeking policy changes, licensure review or institutional findings may need an agency or board. Many matters need both, in sequence, and the sequence is counsel's to set. Statutory prerequisites remain claim-specific: FEHA court employment claims generally require the applicable CRD exhaustion/right-to-sue route; an action against a public entity requires a valid Government Claims Act analysis where that Act governs the particular claim, with proper presentation and exceptions separately checked; a plaintiff who qualifies as a prisoner bringing an action about prison conditions must properly exhaust administrative remedies that were available under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), subject to actual custody and claim-scope rules. Administrative processing should never be described as a universal precondition for every medical or constitutional claim.

The matrix at a glance#

Why this may matter in a CFMG/Wellpath setting#

Remedies run against the entity that is liable. In a structure in which the employer of record, the contracting entity, a professional corporation, a county and a bankruptcy debtor may be different juridical persons (Roadmaps 004, 090, 094), the question "what can be recovered" is inseparable from "against whom" and "was it discharged." The Wellpath plan's treatment of claims against debtors, including provisions for claims to proceed against insurance, is described in Roadmap 091 from the public record. Nothing here states that any entity owes anything to anyone.

Primary authorities#

Opened for this page or reused: 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (AR-024-F06); Lab. Code §§ 203, 218.5, 226, 1198.5, 6310, 98.2 (AR-026-S04, S07, S09; AR-033-S01–S02; AR-0961-S02; AR-126-S01); 8 C.C.R. § 13520 (AR-026-R01); Gov. Code § 12965 (AR-010-S07); Lab. Code §§ 1102.5(f), (j) as read (AR-023-S01); Code Civ. Proc. §§ 377.30, 377.34, 377.60 (AR-065-S08–S07); Civ. Code § 3333.2 (AR-0961-S03); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3) (AR-0961-F04); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (AR-096-F04); City of Newport (AR-C73); Harris (AR-010-C10); Pineda (AR-026-C04); Schachter (AR-026-C01); Lab. Code § 2699 (AR-0261-S01); Bus. & Prof. Code § 2761 (AR-0961-S09).

Additional targeted check on October 18, 2026 (not comprehensive): 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3), (b)(1)–(3), U.S. Supreme Court Pollard (2001), Ninth Circuit Traxler (2010), and California managing-agent standard White as reproduced in CACI 3945/3947; complete California official-text authentication, other judicial history and contextual privilege remain OPEN. Earlier targeted checks: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1997e(d); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), (a)(3) and Supreme Court CIGNA v. Amara. Not opened/uncertified for this page: 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g), 12205, 1988(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 2201; 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 1132(c), (g); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4); Civ. Code §§ 3287, 3294, 3333.1; Code Civ. Proc. §§ 377.61, 425.13, 667.7, 1021.5, 1032, 1060; Lab. Code §§ 218.6, 226(e), 1194; Bus. & Prof. Code § 2227; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); CACI 3921; Smith v. Wade; State Farm v. Campbell; ERISA no-damages authorities.

Related roadmaps#

026, 026.1, 027, 033, 037, 037.1, 044, 090, 091, 092, 096, 096.1, 096.3, 112, 129, 129.1, 130, 130.1, 133.

Remedies cannot be transferred from one forum to another

An agency may investigate or discipline without awarding civil damages; a benefits program may pay wage replacement without determining discrimination; a court may award a remedy only under an applicable cause of action and prerequisites. The matrix must identify each institution's statutory authority rather than aggregate possible remedies as if they were available from a single filing.

What this page cannot do#

It cannot estimate anyone's damages, predict any award, or state that any entity owes anything. It cannot substitute for the Roadmap that carries each claim. Several of its limits are stated at description level and must be opened before publication.