The Master Action-Forum Matrix: Every Forum, What It Decides, Who May Use It, and What It Cannot Do

Scope and warning#

This Roadmap is a navigation product at the Roadmap level. It is not a worksheet and it is not a pleading model. Its tables compress the law, and compression loses nuance; every row points to the Roadmap that carries the full treatment and to the authority register entries that support it. Where a row rests on a reproduction host or on a summary-level read, the register says so.

The matrix is organized in twelve families, A through L, following the project's directive. Families overlap by design: a single set of facts may appear in A, B, C and L at once. The matrix does not merge them, because the forums do not.

Nothing here states that any named entity or person did anything. The entity names used are those that appear in the public bankruptcy record and in public contract documents, and they appear only to illustrate why entity identity matters.

How to read a row#

Each forum is described in a fixed order:

1. Jurisdiction — the statute or rule that gives the forum power.
2. Who may use it — in the vocabulary of Section VII of the project directive: injured employee, former employee, applicant, licensed clinician, patient, incarcerated patient, former detainee or prisoner, estate representative, wrongful-death heir, whistleblower, witness, regulator, person reporting licensed-professional misconduct, or a third party with information but no private claim. The word "standing" is used only in its technical senses (Article III standing, statutory standing, real-party-in-interest) and only where it applies.
3. Within scope / not within scope — what the forum decides and what it does not.
4. Evidence that matters.
5. What the forum can do and what it cannot award.
6. Confidentiality and public record.
7. Exhaustion consequences.
8. Deadline source — statute, trigger, and whether tolling provisions exist, without computation.
9. Official filing source — the agency or court, named; URLs live in the authority register and the public libraries, not in the text.
10. Entity-identity and bankruptcy notes.

The matrix by family#

Family A — Employment and civil rights

A1. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)

Jurisdiction. Title VII, the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) incorporating Title VII's procedures), the ADEA and GINA. Ordinary private-employer coverage is not interchangeable: Title VII, ADA Title I and GINA generally require at least 15 employees (with the applicable statutory employee-count test), whereas the ADEA ordinarily requires at least 20; public-employer coverage and other covered-entity exceptions require separate analysis. Count the relevant employing entity and the statutory aggregation period rather than relying on brand affiliation or a single payroll snapshot (Roadmap 012).

Who may use it. An employee, former employee or applicant who alleges discrimination, failure to accommodate, or retaliation; a person filing on behalf of an aggrieved person; a witness or whistleblower only to the extent the retaliation provision (42 U.S.C. § 12203) covers opposition or participation. A patient in custody is not an EEOC complainant; the ADA's public-services title is enforced elsewhere (Family K).

Within scope. Disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process as evidence of a failure to accommodate, retaliation for protected activity, discriminatory termination, harassment, medical-inquiry violations. Not within scope. Wage claims as such, whistleblower retaliation under California statutes, malpractice, corporate-practice issues, bankruptcy questions, unemployment benefits.

Evidence that matters. The charge itself must contain "A clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices" (29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3)); a charge is sufficient when the Commission "receives from the person making the charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of" (§ 1601.12(b)), and § 1601.12(b) permits amendments to cure technical defects, clarify/amplify original allegations, or add related acts growing out of the subject matter; only amendments within those regulatory categories relate back, not every later new accusation automatically. Check timeliness, verification, respondent identity and charge scope separately. Beyond the charge: the chronology; the accommodation request and response; medical restrictions and clearances; the adverse action; comparators; the employer's stated reason; the records obtained under Roadmap 033.

What it can do. Investigate; attempt conciliation; issue a determination; issue a notice of right to sue; in rare cases litigate. What it cannot award. The EEOC does not enter judgments or award damages; relief comes by conciliation or by the lawsuit that follows the right-to-sue notice.

Confidentiality. Charge files are not public during the administrative process; the employer receives the charge and is required to preserve "all personnel records relevant to the charge or action until final disposition" (29 C.F.R. § 1602.14).

Exhaustion consequences. A timely charge generally must precede a private ADA/Title VII action, and the statutory suit-after-notice requirement remains consequential. Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019), holds that Title VII charge filing is a mandatory but nonjurisdictional claim-processing requirement: a properly and timely asserted defense may bar the claim, but untimely assertion may forfeit that defense. Do not call every exhaustion defect a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The ADEA follows a distinct federal filing/suit framework and must not be mechanically assigned the Title VII right-to-sue sequence.

Deadline source. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (charge-filing period, longer in a deferral state such as California); § 2000e-5(f)(1) (period to sue after the notice of right to sue). Trigger: the discrete act, or the notice. Tolling: fact-dependent; counsel's question. Certainty: Settled as to the statutory periods; Fact-dependent as to triggers.

Official filing source. EEOC (online portal, field office).

Entity and bankruptcy notes. The charge must name the employer; a wrong-entity charge may not support suit against the right one. A charge against a chapter 11 debtor for pre-petition conduct is affected by the automatic stay and later by the discharge and plan injunctions (Roadmap 091), subject to the police-and-regulatory-power exception for the agency's own enforcement; the private claim that the charge preserves may be channeled to the claims process. Counsel question.

A2. California Civil Rights Department (CRD)

Jurisdiction. FEHA (Gov. Code § 12940 et seq.), CFRA (§ 12945.2), pregnancy-disability and related leave (§ 12945 and 2 C.C.R. § 11042 et seq.), and the FEHA record-retention duty (§ 12946).

Who may use it. An employee, former employee or applicant of an employer with five or more employees (fewer for harassment); a person alleging retaliation for protected activity; a person alleging CFRA interference or retaliation. Not a patient; not an incarcerated person as such.

Within scope. Disability discrimination; failure to accommodate; failure to engage in the interactive process, which is an independent FEHA violation (Roadmap 015); retaliation; discriminatory termination; harassment; leave interference and retaliation; medical-inquiry violations (2 C.C.R. § 11071). Not within scope. Labor Code whistleblower claims (§ 1102.5), wage claims, malpractice, licensing, bankruptcy.

Evidence that matters. The same categories as A1; the CRD complaint form asks for the respondent's legal name and the specific acts and dates. Interactive-process communications and the employer's documentation of hardship analysis are central (Roadmaps 014 and 015). For California employer identification, Gov. Code § 12928 creates a rebuttable presumption that an entity identified as employer on a worker's federal Form W-2 falls within FEHA's employer definition. This is meaningful identification evidence, but not an irrebuttable finding of the actual employing entity, joint employment, or discriminatory decision-maker; obtain payroll amendments, contracting, supervision and hiring/control records (Roadmap 094).

What it can do. Conduct intake and, where accepted, investigate or mediate; issue an immediate California right-to-sue notice on request; litigate in its own name in selected cases. What it cannot award. No damages are awarded by the Department itself; remedies come by settlement or by suit. Separate-route warning: CRD expressly says its immediate right-to-sue process does not file that complaint with EEOC. Ordinary agency worksharing must not be assumed to supply federal exhaustion following an immediate state notice. Obtain independent federal filing/status verification if federal claims are contemplated.

Confidentiality. Complaint files are confidential during investigation; the respondent receives the complaint.

Exhaustion consequences. A CRD complaint and a California right-to-sue notice are ordinarily required before an individual FEHA employment action (Gov. Code § 12965), subject to the actual statutory provisions and exceptions. The CRD intake form is not proof that a verified administrative complaint was accepted for investigation; under CRD's current process a representative evaluates whether a formal complaint can be accepted. Preserve the distinct intake-submission, verified-complaint, closure, and notice dates. 2026 statutory distinction: Gov. Code § 12960(b), as amended by SB 477 (Stats. 2025, ch. 321), provides that for that section filing means filing the CRD intake form and that the operative date of the later verified complaint relates back to the intake date. Separately, § 12965(b) defines filing for § 12965 as filing a verified complaint. Relation-back protection does not prove that a verification occurred, who was named as respondent, federal EEOC filing, or an issued right-to-sue notice. Preserve both timestamps and the verified charge. CRD immediate right-to-sue election generally foregoes its investigation.

Deadline source. For most FEHA employment-practice complaints, Gov. Code § 12960(e)(5) provides a three-year administrative filing period; different violations under § 12960(e) carry distinct periods. As amended by SB 477 (effective January 1, 2026), § 12960(b) preserves an intake-to-verified-complaint relation-back rule, and § 12960(e)(6)(B) allows a narrow, fact-dependent period of up to one year after rebuttal of the employer-identity presumption under § 12928 to substitute the actual employer; it is not a blanket extension for every corrected respondent. Section 12960(f) addresses civil-action tolling through investigation closure or a timely administrative closure appeal, and expressly says its retroactive operation does not revive already-lapsed claims. Section 12965(c)(1)(D) and related provisions govern right-to-sue notice and litigation timing. Verify the particular complaint and notice under the chaptered enactment; chaptered text was accessible through a third-party reproduction, not directly from the official Legislature host. Trigger and tolling differ by claim; do not compute a deadline from this matrix.

Official filing source. CRD (online intake, Cal Civil Rights System).

Entity and bankruptcy notes. As A1. FEHA's definition of "employer" and the joint-employer and integrated-enterprise tests differ from the Labor Code's (Roadmap 094).

A3. California superior court — employment causes of action

Jurisdiction. General jurisdiction over state-law claims (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10); unlimited civil jurisdiction where the amount in controversy exceeds the limited-civil threshold. See Family G for the pleading system.

Who may use it. An employee or former employee (real party in interest on their own claims); an estate representative or successor in interest for survival claims (Code Civ. Proc. § 377.30); a PAGA plaintiff as a proxy for the state (Roadmap 026.1). "Statutory standing" is the correct phrase for whether a statute gives a person a right of action; "real party in interest" for whether the plaintiff is the person whose right is sued on.

Within scope. FEHA claims after exhaustion; Labor Code § 1102.5 and § 1102.6 whistleblower claims (no administrative exhaustion required; Roadmap 021); Health & Safety Code § 1278.5 and Bus. & Prof. Code § 2056 claims (Roadmap 022); wrongful termination in violation of public policy (Roadmap 011); breach of contract and implied contract (Roadmap 028); wage claims under Labor Code §§ 200–2751 (Roadmap 026); personnel-record penalties and injunctive relief (Roadmap 033); declaratory and injunctive relief where a statute or equity supplies it. Not within scope. Claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the WCAB (Roadmap 037.1); ERISA claims except those within concurrent jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1); claims released or discharged in bankruptcy.

Deadline source. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (two years, personal injury, including Tameny claims per Roadmap 010); § 337(a) (written contract); § 339(1) (oral contract); § 338(a) (liability created by statute, three years, applied to § 1102.5 per Roadmap 021); § 340(a) (one year, statutory penalties); Gov. Code § 12965 (FEHA); Labor Code § 203 claims as treated in Roadmap 026. Trigger and tolling: fact-dependent.

Official filing source. Superior court of the county where venue lies.

Entity and bankruptcy notes. Doe pleading (Code Civ. Proc. § 474) is available for unknown defendants; it does not cure naming the wrong known entity. The bankruptcy gate (Family L) applies before any debtor entity is named.

A4. United States District Court — federal employment causes of action

Jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) for ADA, Title VII, FMLA, ERISA and § 1983 claims; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction over state claims "so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III," subject to the court's discretion to decline under § 1367(c) and the tolling rule of § 1367(d). See Family H.

Who may use it. As A3, with the addition that Article III standing (injury, causation, redressability) is a constitutional requirement in federal court.

Within scope. ADA employment claims after EEOC exhaustion (Roadmap 012); ADA retaliation (§ 12203); FMLA interference and retaliation (29 U.S.C. § 2615, § 2617; Roadmap 024), which require no administrative exhaustion; ERISA benefit and fiduciary claims (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); Roadmap 027); § 1983 claims against public employers for First Amendment retaliation; supplemental state claims. Not within scope. State claims without an anchoring federal claim, unless diversity exists, which requires complete diversity and the amount in controversy and must never be assumed.

Deadline source. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (post-notice period for ADA/Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c) (FMLA two years, three for willful); ERISA plan terms and borrowed state limitation periods (counsel question); state periods for supplemental claims, with § 1367(d) tolling.

Official filing source. The district court for the district where venue lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Family B — Wages, payroll and employee records

B1. California Labor Commissioner (Division of Labor Standards Enforcement)

Jurisdiction. Labor Code § 98(a): "The Labor Commissioner is authorized to investigate employee complaints. The Labor Commissioner may provide for a hearing in any action to recover wages, penalties, and other demands for compensation"; within 30 days of a complaint the Commissioner must notify the parties whether a hearing will be held, and a hearing is to be held within 90 days of that determination. Retaliation complaints under § 98.7 (Roadmap 021). Personnel-record and payroll-record penalties under §§ 1198.5(k) and 226(f) are recoverable by "the current or former employee or the Labor Commissioner" (Roadmap 033).

Who may use it. An employee or former employee; the Commissioner on its own motion; a representative. Classification disputes may be raised by the worker (Labor Code §§ 2775, 2783; Roadmap 095), with physicians and other listed professionals governed by the Borello test rather than the ABC test.

Within scope. Unpaid wages and final wages (§§ 201–203); wage statements (§ 226); waiting-time penalties (§ 203); expense reimbursement (§ 2802, not opened for this page); commissions and contractual compensation to the extent they are "wages" (§ 200; Roadmap 026); record-access penalties; retaliation under § 98.7 for complaints within the Commissioner's jurisdiction, including § 1102.5 and § 6310 complaints. Not within scope. Discrimination as such; malpractice; CPOM; ERISA plan benefits; unemployment insurance.

Evidence that matters. Wage statements; payroll records obtained under § 226(b)–(c); the offer letter and any written compensation terms obtained under § 432; the hiring notice under § 2810.5 (Roadmap 094); time records; the employer's stated basis for non-payment.

What it can do. Hold a Berman hearing and issue an order, decision or award; assess penalties; investigate retaliation and order reinstatement and lost wages under § 98.7. What it cannot award. Emotional-distress damages, punitive damages, FEHA remedies, ERISA remedies.

Confidentiality. Berman hearing files are agency records; decisions may be enforced as judgments. Retaliation-complaint files are investigative records.

Exhaustion consequences. A Berman claim is an alternative to suit, not a prerequisite. A § 98.7 complaint is not a prerequisite to a § 1102.5 lawsuit (Labor Code § 244(a); Roadmap 021).

Deadline source. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 337, 339, 338(a), 340(a) as applied to wage and penalty claims (Roadmap 026, which explains the Pineda rule on § 203 penalties); Labor Code § 98.7(a) (period to file a retaliation complaint). Certainty: Settled as to periods; Fact-dependent as to accrual.

Official filing source. DLSE (Wage Claim Adjudication; Retaliation Complaint Investigation Unit).

Entity and bankruptcy notes. Wage claims against a debtor for pre-petition wages are claims in the bankruptcy, with priority to the statutory extent; post-petition and post-effective-date wages are not discharged. Non-debtor employers are unaffected by the discharge (Roadmap 091). Labor Code § 2810.3 client-employer liability (Roadmap 094) may reach an entity that was not the employer of record.

B2. Private Attorneys General Act notice (LWDA) and PAGA action

See Roadmap 026.1. Jurisdiction: Labor Code §§ 2699, 2699.3. Who may use it: an "aggrieved employee" as the statute defines the term, after the 2024 amendments. Prerequisite: written notice to the LWDA and the employer. Deadline source: § 2699.3 (notice and waiting periods) and Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a) (one year for penalties). Not within scope: individual damages. Bankruptcy note: PAGA penalties for pre-petition violations against a debtor are subject to the plan (counsel question).

B3. Personnel and payroll records (self-help statutory requests)

Not a forum, but the gateway to every forum. Labor Code §§ 1198.5, 226(b)–(c) and 432, with the 30-day, 21-day and on-request rules and the $750 penalties (Roadmap 033). The right under § 1198.5 ceases during a lawsuit relating to a personnel matter (§ 1198.5(n)–(o)).

Family C — Employment Development Department (EDD) and the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CUIAB)

Jurisdiction. Unemployment insurance (Unemp. Ins. Code § 1256 and related sections; Roadmap 027.2); State Disability Insurance and Paid Family Leave (§§ 2626, 2627, 2708, 3301); employer registration and reporting (§ 606.5 and the payroll-tax provisions; Roadmap 094); confidentiality of EDD records (§ 1094).

Who may use it. A claimant for benefits (the worker); an employer contesting a claim; a worker reporting an employer-identity discrepancy or non-reporting, who has a role as a claimant whose wages must be credited to the correct employer account, but who is not a party to any payroll-tax enforcement against the employer. The directive's instruction governs: EDD does not decide discrimination, malpractice, CPOM liability or any other civil claim.

Within scope. Eligibility for UI, including whether the separation was for misconduct or a voluntary quit without good cause (§ 1256); eligibility for SDI and PFL; the base period and the wages credited to it, which is where employer-identity discrepancies surface; overpayment and false-statement determinations. Not within scope. Whether the termination was unlawful; damages; the employer's liability to the worker.

Evidence that matters. The notice of determination; wage statements and W-2s (Roadmaps 094 and 095); the employer's stated reason for separation as given to EDD, which may later be compared with the reason given elsewhere (Roadmap 036); medical certification for SDI.

What it can do. Pay or deny benefits; make determinations that are appealable to an administrative law judge and then to the Board; correct wage credits. What it cannot award. Damages, reinstatement, penalties against the employer payable to the worker.

Confidentiality. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1094 makes EDD information confidential, with listed exceptions, one of which concerns use in proceedings; the collateral-estoppel effect of a UI determination in a later lawsuit is limited by § 1960 (Roadmap 027.2).

Exhaustion consequences. A determination becomes final if not appealed within the statutory period; the appeal route is the only route.

Deadline source. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1328 (period to appeal a determination, with good-cause extension); §§ 2707.2 and 3301 for SDI/PFL claims (Roadmap 027.2). Certainty: Settled.

Official filing source. EDD (claims; appeals filed with EDD or CUIAB).

Entity and bankruptcy notes. UI and SDI are not claims against the employer and are unaffected by the employer's bankruptcy except where the employer's account history is in question; the "employer" for EDD purposes may differ from the employer for FEHA or the Labor Code (Roadmap 094).

Family D — Professional licensing and medical regulation

D1. Medical Board of California (MBC)

Jurisdiction. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2220 (enforcement authority); § 2220.08 (central complaint and investigation intake); § 2220.7 (complaint priorities); § 2234 (unprofessional conduct, including gross negligence, repeated negligent acts, incompetence); Gov. Code § 12529 (Health Quality Enforcement Section of the Attorney General prosecutes; Roadmap 093). See Roadmap 092.

Who may use it. Anyone with information: a patient, a family member, a coworker, a clinician, an employer, another agency. Board complaint intake does not require a private claim; a person who could never sue may still report. This is the clearest example of the distinction between administrative complainant eligibility and statutory standing to sue.

Within scope. The conduct of a licensed physician or surgeon; the unlicensed practice of medicine; a physician's participation in an arrangement that violates the corporate-practice provisions (§§ 2400, 2401, 2408; Roadmap 030). Not within scope. The conduct of a company as such, except through the licensee; damages to anyone; employment disputes; the standard of care as a civil question.

Evidence that matters. Medical records (which the Board obtains by authorization or subpoena); the complainant's chronology; the identity of the licensee and the facility; documents showing non-physician direction of medical decisions (Roadmap 031).

What it can do. Investigate; refer to the Attorney General; file an accusation; impose discipline from public reprimand to revocation; issue citations. What it cannot award. Money to the complainant; reinstatement; any civil remedy.

Confidentiality. Complaints and investigations are confidential; accusations and disciplinary actions are public; § 2027 governs the Board's public profile disclosures (Roadmap 092). § 805 reports from peer-review bodies are confidential (Roadmap 032).

Exhaustion consequences. None; a Board complaint is not a prerequisite to anything and does not toll any civil deadline.

Deadline source. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2230.5 governs the Board's time to file an accusation (not opened for this page; stated in Roadmap 092 at the level it was read); no deadline governs the complainant.

Official filing source. Medical Board of California (online complaint; Central Complaint Unit).

Entity and bankruptcy notes. Board proceedings against a licensee are unaffected by any employer's bankruptcy; the police-and-regulatory-power exception to the automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), not opened for this page; see Roadmap 091) preserves governmental regulatory proceedings.

D2. Osteopathic Medical Board of California (OMBC)

As D1, for osteopathic physicians, under Bus. & Prof. Code § 2450 and the Osteopathic Act, with prosecution through the Attorney General. Roadmap 092 carries the detail. Complaint intake, confidentiality and remedies parallel the MBC.

D3. Board of Registered Nursing (BRN)

Jurisdiction. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2761: "The board may take disciplinary action against a certified or licensed nurse or deny an application for a certificate or license for any of the following," including unprofessional conduct such as "Incompetence or gross negligence in carrying out usual certified or licensed nursing functions," and conviction of a substantially related offense. The Board of Vocational Nursing and Psychiatric Technicians regulates LVNs and psychiatric technicians under separate provisions (not opened for this page).

Who may use it. Anyone with information, as D1. A nurse reporting a coworker; a patient; a family member; an employer (which may have mandatory reporting duties not analyzed here).

Within scope. The conduct of the licensed nurse. Not within scope. The employer's staffing decisions as such, except as they bear on a licensee's conduct; damages; employment claims.

Evidence, remedies, confidentiality, exhaustion, deadlines. As D1, with the Board's own statutes governing the time to file an accusation (not opened).

Official filing source. Board of Registered Nursing (online complaint).

D4. Physician Assistant Board; Dental Board

Each regulates its licensees under its own practice act (Bus. & Prof. Code § 3500 et seq.; § 1600 et seq.; not opened for this page). The same structure applies: anyone may report; the board disciplines licensees; it awards nothing to the complainant. These rows are included because correctional health care commonly uses physician assistants and contracts for dental care; they are marked as unverified at the section level and must be opened before publication.

D5. Other boards

A board is listed only when jurisdiction exists over a licensee involved in the facts. Pharmacy (Bus. & Prof. Code § 4000 et seq.), psychology, behavioral sciences and the Emergency Medical Services Authority may be relevant in particular cases. None is a general "complaint destination"; the directive forbids listing an agency merely because it exists.

Family E — Corporate practice of medicine and professional independence

Jurisdiction. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2400, 2401, 2408 (corporate-practice prohibition and the professional-corporation exceptions); § 650 (fee splitting and referral compensation); § 2056 (physician advocacy protection); Health & Saf. Code §§ 1190–1192 (SB 351, Stats. 2025, ch. 409, private-equity and hedge-fund interference provisions); the Medical Board's corporate-practice guidance. See Roadmaps 030 and 031.

Who may use it. There is no single forum. A physician alleging retaliation for advocacy uses the courts under § 2056 (Roadmap 022). A person reporting a corporate-practice violation reports to the Medical Board (D1) as to the licensee's participation, and the Attorney General may act under SB 351 and the unfair-competition law where the statutes supply authority (Roadmap 093). A private plaintiff may raise CPOM as a defense to enforcement of an unlawful contract (Epic Medical Management; Roadmap 030) or as a public-policy source for a Tameny claim. The directive's rule governs: a CPOM concern does not automatically create a private damages action.

Within scope. Lay ownership or control of a medical practice; non-physician direction of medical decisions; fee-splitting arrangements; interference with a physician's advocacy. Not within scope. Ordinary administrative direction that does not reach medical judgment (Roadmap 031); employment terms the physician agreed to; the county's contracting decisions as such.

Evidence that matters. The management services agreement and the professional corporation's governing documents to the extent they are public or obtained in discovery; the public bankruptcy record describing the professional corporations and the management structure (Roadmap 090); protocols, utilization-review communications, and documents showing who decided a clinical question (Roadmap 031).

What the forums can do. The Medical Board disciplines the licensee; the Attorney General may seek injunctive relief and penalties under the statutes that authorize it; a court may decline to enforce an unlawful contract and may hear a § 2056 or Tameny claim. What they cannot award. The Board awards nothing to a complainant; the Attorney General represents the public, not the complainant.

Entity and bankruptcy notes. The public record of the Wellpath cases describes physician-owned professional corporations as non-debtors managed under management services agreements, and the confirmation record defines "Related Party" to exclude "the Professional Corporations and their respective owners and employees" (Roadmap 090). What that structure means for any CPOM question is a counsel question, not a finding of this page.

Family F — Medical malpractice and professional negligence

Jurisdiction. California superior court; federal court only with an anchoring federal claim or diversity. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5 (limitation); § 364 (90-day pre-suit notice); Civ. Code § 3333.2 (MICRA noneconomic-damages limits as amended effective Jan. 1, 2023); Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60 (wrongful death) and § 377.30 (survival). Government Claims Act for public-entity defendants (Family J). Roadmaps 044 and the 051–099 malpractice pages carry the elements.

Who may use it. The patient; for a death, the persons listed in § 377.60 ("the decedent's surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and issue of deceased children," or those who would take by intestate succession, and dependent putative spouses, stepchildren and parents under § 377.60(b)(1)) or the personal representative on their behalf; for survival claims, "the decedent's personal representative or, if none, ... the decedent's successor in interest" (§ 377.30). An incarcerated patient may sue; a former detainee may sue; a family member who is not an heir has no wrongful-death claim.

Within scope. Duty, breach of the standard of care, causation and damages against individual clinicians, professional entities, and corporate defendants where vicarious or direct liability is legally available; wrongful death; survival. Not within scope. Constitutional claims (Family I); employment claims; licensing discipline.

Evidence that matters. Medical records obtained lawfully (Health & Saf. Code § 123110 and 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 for the patient's own records; the estate's rights after death); custody and medication records obtained in discovery; expert review, without which no malpractice claim should be filed. The directive's rule governs: no malpractice allegation without facts and appropriate expert support.

What the forum can do. Award economic damages; award noneconomic damages subject to § 3333.2's limits, which the current text sets at $350,000 for non-death cases beginning January 1, 2023, increasing $40,000 each year to $750,000, and $500,000 for wrongful death, increasing $50,000 each year to $1,000,000, with separate limits for providers and institutions as the statute defines them; award survival damages, which under § 377.34(a) exclude pain, suffering and disfigurement except for actions filed in the window § 377.34(b) describes ("on or after January 1, 2022, and before January 1, 2026" in the text as read); punitive damages subject to Code Civ. Proc. § 425.13 (not opened). What it cannot award. Unlimited noneconomic damages against health-care providers for professional negligence.

Confidentiality. Peer-review records are protected by Evid. Code § 1157 (Roadmap 032); medical records are protected by the CMIA and HIPAA except as the patient or estate authorizes or a court orders.

Exhaustion consequences. § 364 notice before suit against a health-care provider; Government Claims Act presentation before suit against a public entity or its employees (Family J). The PLRA does not apply to state-law claims as such, but a prisoner's federal action with supplemental state claims is subject to it as to the federal claims.

Deadline source. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5 (three years from injury or one year from discovery, whichever first, with stated tolling grounds — the project's five-component rule applies: period, trigger, tolling, certainty "Settled as to text; Fact-dependent as to application"); § 364(d) (90-day extension where notice is served within the last 90 days); Gov. Code §§ 911.2, 945.4, 945.6 for public entities; Code Civ. Proc. § 352.1 (tolling for imprisonment, with the unsettled question of its application to pretrial detention; AR-S603, AR-C49–C51).

Official filing source. Superior court.

Entity and bankruptcy notes. The Wellpath plan treated personal-injury and wrongful-death claims against debtors through the plan's procedures, with an opt-out mechanism for incarcerated persons whose date the record states inconsistently (Roadmap 091). Claims against non-debtor professional corporations and their physician owners are outside the debtors' discharge; claims against individual clinicians employed by debtors raise the question whether the plan's third-party releases reached them, which after Purdue Pharma requires consent (Roadmap 091). Counsel question in every case.

Family G — California superior court pleading system

This family is the procedural chassis for Families A3, B, F and J. The educational pleading models at 129–129.1 implement it. The matrix states the rules; the models show the anatomy.

• Subject-matter jurisdiction. Superior court general jurisdiction; classification as limited or unlimited civil by amount in controversy.
• Venue. Code Civ. Proc. § 395 (not opened): generally the county where a defendant resides or where the injury occurred; employment cases commonly where the work was performed. Contractual forum clauses are a counsel question.
• Parties. Named by exact legal name; the Entity Identity Worksheet (101) governs; Doe defendants under Code Civ. Proc. § 474 for defendants whose names are unknown; the relation-back rules are a counsel question (AR-C55 Woo v. Superior Court, pending verification).
• Summons and service. Code Civ. Proc. § 412.20 et seq. (not opened); service on a corporation through its registered agent identified in Corp. Code § 1502 filings (Roadmap 094).
• Causes of action. Each stated separately with its elements; the complaint "shall contain" "A statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language" and "A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled" (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.10(a)); in personal-injury and wrongful-death actions the amount of damages is not stated (§ 425.10(b)).
• Factual pleading. Ultimate facts, not evidence and not conclusions; every factual allegation certified under Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7(b)(3) to "have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, [be] likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."
• Attachments and exhibits. Generally not attached to the complaint except written contracts sued upon and the right-to-sue notice where required.
• Verification. Required only where a statute requires it; employment complaints generally are not verified.
• Filing fees and fee waivers. Gov. Code § 70611 et seq. and the fee-waiver rules (not opened).
• Case management, discovery, dispositive motions, trial, settlement, appeal. At a high level: case management conference; the Civil Discovery Act; demurrer (§ 430.10) and motion to strike; summary judgment (§ 437c); jury trial in actions at law; appeal from the final judgment to the Court of Appeal. Roadmap 038 carries employment discovery.

Family H — Federal district court pleading system

• Subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for federal questions; § 1367 for supplemental state claims; diversity only where complete diversity and the amount in controversy exist. Never manufacture jurisdiction. A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)).
• Venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (not opened): where a defendant resides if all reside in the state; where a substantial part of the events occurred.
• Pleading standard. Rule 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Under Twombly, that obligation "requires more than labels and conclusions," and "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" (550 U.S. at 555). Under Iqbal, "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,'" and "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged"; "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" (556 U.S. at 678). Iqbal also holds that in a § 1983 or Bivens action "each Government official ... is only liable for his or her own misconduct" (id. at 676–677), which is why federal models plead each defendant's own acts.
• Rule 11. By presenting a pleading, the signer certifies that "the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3)); sanctions follow under Rule 11(c).
• Service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (not opened); waiver of service is common for corporate defendants.
• Rule 12 and Rule 56. Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; summary judgment.
• Discovery, experts, trial, appeal. Rules 26–37; Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosures; jury trial on demand under Rule 38 for legal claims; appeal to the Ninth Circuit from a final judgment.
• Individual versus entity; official capacity. An individual defendant is liable only for personal participation (Iqbal); a private entity is liable under § 1983 only under Monell (Tsao); a county is liable only under Monell; official-capacity claims against county officers are claims against the county.
• Exhaustion. PLRA exhaustion for prisoners' federal claims about prison conditions (Family I); EEOC exhaustion for ADA/Title VII claims.

Family I — Correctional health-care civil rights

I1. Section 1983 in federal district court

Jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (AR-096-F03); 28 U.S.C. § 1331; § 1367 for supplemental state claims.

Who may use it. The person whose rights were violated (the detainee or prisoner, current or former); after death, the survivors and successors under state survival law as borrowed by § 1988 (counsel question; Roadmaps 040–050 and the death pages); a family member's own Fourteenth Amendment familial-association claim where recognized (not analyzed here). Not an employee as such; not a witness.

Within scope. Pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment claims for inadequate medical care, judged under the objective standard: "(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries," where the plaintiff must "prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard" (Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2018), slip op. at 12–13; Roadmap 042). Convicted prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims, which require that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" be shown (Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104) under the subjective standard of Farmer v. Brennan: the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety" (511 U.S. at 837), knowledge being "a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence" (id. at 842) (Roadmap 043). Delayed diagnosis and treatment, medication, referrals, emergency care, suicide prevention, mental health, withdrawal, chronic disease, dental care, disability, pregnancy and death in custody are applications of these standards, each carried by its Roadmap in 051–099.

Not within scope. Negligence: "A complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment" (Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Roadmap 044). Respondeat superior against any entity: "A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory" (Monell, 436 U.S. at 691), and the Ninth Circuit "see[s] no basis in the reasoning underlying Monell to distinguish between municipalities and private entities acting under color of state law" (Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2012), slip op. at 12858). Private contractors act under color of state law when performing the state's medical function: "It is the physician's function within the state system, not the precise terms of his employment, that determines whether his actions can fairly be attributed to the State," and "Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody" (West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 55–56).

Entity liability. A county, a sheriff in official capacity, and a private contractor are each liable only where "execution of a government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury" (Monell, 436 U.S. at 694) — policy, custom, failure to train, failure to supervise, or staffing as policy (Roadmaps 047–050). Individual clinicians and custody staff are liable for their own conduct (Iqbal). Private-contractor employees do not enjoy qualified immunity in the circumstances Richardson v. McKnight describes (521 U.S. at 412–413), a holding the Court "answered ... narrowly"; whether a particular defendant may claim immunity is a counsel question.

Evidence that matters. Medical and custody records; medication administration records; sick-call requests and responses; referral and transport records; grievances and responses (which also prove exhaustion); staffing schedules and contract staffing requirements; policies and training materials; prior incidents and prior lawsuits as evidence of notice; death-review and mortality-review documents to the extent discoverable; expert opinion on causation and standard of care, which remains necessary even though the claim is constitutional.

What the forum can do. Compensatory damages; punitive damages against individuals (Smith v. Wade, pending verification); injunctive relief where a continuing violation exists and the PLRA's limits on prospective relief are satisfied (18 U.S.C. § 3626, not opened); attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (pending verification). What it cannot award. Punitive damages against a county (City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, AR-C73); a qualifying prisoner action seeking mental or emotional injury recovery is constrained by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) **absent a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act within the statutory definition**. That statute's applicability and its interaction with nominal, punitive, constitutional, or post-release claims must be examined separately; do not restate it as a categorical bar to all recovery without physical injury.

Exhaustion. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) extends to prison-condition actions under **§ 1983 or any other federal law brought by a statutory prisoner confined at the operative filing time; the claimant's status and the case's prison-condition subject matter must be separately tested. The duty reaches only administrative remedies that are available**. "Courts may not engraft an unwritten 'special circumstances' exception onto the PLRA's exhaustion requirement," but "An inmate, that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones," and a remedy is unavailable where it "operates as a simple dead end," where the scheme is "so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use," or where administrators "thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation" (Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016)). The PLRA applies to persons who are prisoners when suit is filed; a released former detainee's position is a counsel question (Roadmap 041).

Deadline source. Section 1983 borrows California's personal-injury period, Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (two years), with federal accrual rules (Wallace v. Kato, AR-C07) and California tolling rules including § 352.1 for imprisonment, whose application to pretrial detention is unsettled (AR-S603, AR-C49–C51). Certainty: Settled as to the borrowed period; Unsettled as to § 352.1's reach; Fact-dependent as to accrual.

Official filing source. The district court for the district in which the facility lies (Central, Eastern, Northern or Southern District of California).

Entity and bankruptcy notes. The Wellpath plan and confirmation order addressed claims by incarcerated persons against debtors, including an opt-out mechanism; the H.I.G. opinion (Doc. 956) holds that derivative claims were estate property and were released even as to opt-outs (Roadmap 090). Claims against a county or sheriff are unaffected by a contractor's bankruptcy. Claims against individual clinicians are affected only to the extent the releases lawfully reached them. Counsel question in every case.

I2. California superior court — the same facts as state-law claims

Negligence, professional negligence, wrongful death and survival (Family F); Gov. Code § 845.6 (public-entity liability for failure to summon medical care, not opened; Roadmap 044); the Bane Act (Civ. Code § 52.1, not opened) and the Unruh Act are counsel questions. The Government Claims Act applies to public-entity defendants (Family J) and does not apply to private contractors as such.

Family J — The Government Claims Act

Jurisdiction. Gov. Code § 900 et seq. See Roadmap 008 and the 051–099 Government Claims Act page.

Who is a public entity. The county, the sheriff's department, a county hospital district, the state. A private contractor is not a public entity; its employees are not public employees. Whether a particular clinician was a county employee or a contractor's employee is a fact question that the Entity Identity Worksheet is designed to capture.

When presentation is required. For covered damages claims against a public entity, § 945.4 ordinarily requires timely presentation. Under § 950.2, a covered state-law action against a public employee acting within the scope of public employment may be barred when the corresponding action against the employing entity is barred—even if the public entity is immune. But § 950.4 provides a pleading-and-proof exception where the claimant did not know or have reason to know, during the presentation window, that public-entity action or an in-scope public employee caused the injury. Section 950 states a different baseline for a direct employee claim; do not say that a separate claim must necessarily be served on the employee. This presentation regime is not a precondition to a federal § 1983 claim (Felder v. Casey, subsequent history still held here); companion state causes must be assessed individually, including statutory exceptions.

The claims. Six months "after the accrual of the cause of action" for claims relating to death, injury to person or personal property (§ 911.2); one year for other claims (§ 911.2). Late-claim application (§ 911.4) within a year of accrual with a reasonable-cause showing; denial; petition for relief from the claim requirement (§ 946.6, not opened).

Suit deadline. Six months from written notice of rejection (§ 945.6(a)(1)); two years from accrual if no written notice was given (§ 945.6(a)(2)).

Statutory exceptions. § 905 lists claims excepted from presentation (AR-S501); counsel question.

County/private-contractor distinction. The Act's presentation requirement does not run to the private contractor; the ordinary limitation periods do. A single incident may thus carry two different sets of deadlines.

Malpractice and wrongful-death overlap. The six-month claim period runs independently of § 340.5 and § 364; § 364's extension does not extend the claim-presentation period (counsel question; not analyzed here).

Tolling and uncertainty. Code Civ. Proc. § 352.1 does not toll the claim-presentation period (counsel question); minority and incapacity have their own rules. Certainty: Settled as to the periods; Fact-dependent as to accrual; Unsettled as to several interactions. Never calculate an individual's deadline.

Official filing source. The clerk of the board of supervisors or the entity's designated claims office; the state's Government Claims Program for state entities.

Family K — Federal and state regulatory pathways

An agency appears below only where the project has identified a statute giving it jurisdiction over the conduct in question. For each, the ten points are stated at the level the authorities were read; rows marked "not opened" must be verified before publication.

K1. U.S. Department of Labor — Wage and Hour Division

Jurisdiction: FLSA minimum wage, overtime and recordkeeping (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; 29 C.F.R. § 516.5 for record retention, verified); FMLA enforcement (29 U.S.C. § 2617; AR-024-F06). Who may complain: any employee. Within scope: FLSA and FMLA violations. Not within scope: California-only wage rules, discrimination. Remedies: back wages, liquidated damages in agency-supervised settlements, litigation by the Secretary. Confidentiality: complainant identity protected as a matter of agency practice. Exhaustion: none required for an FLSA or FMLA private action. Deadline source: 29 U.S.C. § 255 (FLSA two years, three for willful; not opened); § 2617(c) (FMLA). Official source: WHD.

K2. U.S. Department of Labor — Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA)

Jurisdiction: ERISA-governed plans (29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.); private civil actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B) "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits," and under § 1132(a)(3) for "other appropriate equitable relief"; federal jurisdiction exclusive except that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over (a)(1)(B) claims (§ 1132(e)(1)). Who may complain: participants and beneficiaries. Within scope: plan administration, fiduciary conduct, benefit denials, COBRA notice violations (Roadmap 027.1). Not within scope: wages, discrimination, plans exempt from ERISA (governmental and church plans; certain top-hat plans are partly exempt — Roadmap 027, in queue). Remedies: EBSA investigates and may bring enforcement; benefit recovery is by civil action. Internal claims exhaustion: An ERISA plan-benefits claim under § 1132(a)(1)(B) ordinarily follows the plan's applicable administrative denial-and-appeal procedure before suit, subject to regulatory deemed-exhausted provisions, procedural defects and recognized exceptions; do not describe this as a universal agency exhaustion requirement for every ERISA fiduciary-duty theory. Relevant plan documents, denial notices and the actual appeals record matter. Deadline source: plan-specific contractual limitations, governing federal claims regulations, and any applicable statutory limits; do not assume a borrowed state period universally controls. This row is included only where ERISA genuinely applies; a plan's ERISA status (including governmental/church/top-hat characteristics and any NQDCP structure) is a threshold question, never assumed.

K3. OSHA and Cal/OSHA

Jurisdiction: in California, Cal/OSHA (Division of Occupational Safety and Health) enforces workplace safety under Labor Code § 6300 et seq. under a federally approved state plan. Retaliation: Labor Code § 6310(a) ("No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has" made a safety complaint or participated in a proceeding) and § 6310(b) (an employee discharged or discriminated against "shall be entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by the acts of the employer"); the retaliation complaint is filed with the Labor Commissioner under § 98.7. Who may complain: any employee; a union. Within scope: hazardous conditions, workplace-violence prevention plans in health-care settings (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 3342, not opened), retaliation. Not within scope: patient care standards as such, employment discrimination. Remedies: citations and penalties against the employer; reinstatement and lost wages through § 98.7. Deadline source: § 98.7(a) for the retaliation complaint. Official source: Cal/OSHA (complaints); DLSE (retaliation).

K4. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)

Jurisdiction: Medicare and Medicaid conditions of participation for certified providers and suppliers. Scope limitation: county jails are generally not CMS-certified providers, and federal reimbursement for incarcerated persons is restricted; CMS jurisdiction over jail health care is therefore ordinarily absent. Included to say so. A hospital that treated the patient after transfer is a CMS-certified provider, and EMTALA (42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, not opened) may apply to it. Official source: CMS and the state survey agency (CDPH) for hospital complaints. Roadmap 099 treats CMS's role in custody health care.

K5. HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR)

Jurisdiction: distinguish (1) HIPAA Privacy/Security/Breach Notification, (2) 42 C.F.R. Part 2 substance-use-disorder record confidentiality, and (3) healthcare civil-rights programs under Section 504, Section 1557, and other applicable civil-rights laws; these are different respondent definitions and proof theories. OCR began Part 2 complaint enforcement on February 16, 2026, the compliance date for the 2024 Part 2 rule. HHS's guidance updated September 29, 2026 states that Part 2 generally applies to federally assisted programs providing substance-use-disorder diagnosis, treatment, or referral, and specified downstream holders of Part 2 records; the presence of addiction-related information in a jail chart alone does not establish Part 2 coverage. OCR may investigate and pursue corrective action or civil monetary penalties, but this is not an individual private damages remedy. Anyone may submit a Part 2 complaint, subject to the OCR complaint-process requirements. Who may complain: a person with information about a covered HIPAA entity/business associate, an applicable Part 2 program/qualified service organization/lawful holder, or a covered healthcare program or activity, depending on the pathway. Within scope: covered PHI or Part 2 records and covered federally assisted health programs. Not within scope: malpractice as such; garden-variety private employment disputes; covered-entity, custody exception, and federal-financial-assistance facts must be proven, not presumed. Remedies: agency investigations, compliance action and qualifying penalties; HIPAA alone creates no private damages cause of action. HIPAA/Part 2 complaint timing: HHS OCR states 180 days from awareness, extendable for good cause. HIPAA complainant contact: OCR says it does not investigate HIPAA complaints submitted without the complainant's name and contact information; distinguish confidentiality requests from anonymous filings. HHS civil-rights complaints have a distinct intake route. Official source: HHS OCR privacy/Part 2 and civil-rights portals. Roadmap 099 contains broader context, not a substitute for pathway verification.

K6. HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG)

Jurisdiction: fraud, waste and abuse in HHS programs; the federal False Claims Act is enforced by the Department of Justice, with qui tam actions by relators under 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (not opened; Roadmap 096 Family C). Scope limitation: federal health-program funds flowing to jail health care are limited; a federal FCA theory requires a federal payment nexus. The California False Claims Act (Gov. Code § 12650 et seq.; § 12652 opened, AR-093-S03) reaches county funds and is enforced by the Attorney General and local prosecutors, with qui tam provisions (Roadmap 093). Who may complain: anyone, including a whistleblower-relator with original information. Remedies: treble damages and penalties to the government; a relator's share. Confidentiality: qui tam complaints are filed under seal. Deadline source: 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) and Gov. Code § 12654 (not opened). Official source: DOJ (federal); California Attorney General (state).

K7. U.S. Department of Justice — Civil Rights Division

Jurisdiction: the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a): the Attorney General may sue when there is "reasonable cause to believe that any State or political subdivision ... is subjecting persons residing in or confined to an institution ... to egregious or flagrant conditions which deprive such persons of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States causing such persons to suffer grievous harm, and that such deprivation is pursuant to a pattern or practice of resistance"; the ADA's public-services title (42 U.S.C. § 12132, not opened); and the pattern-or-practice authority of 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 14141), under which the Attorney General may obtain equitable and declaratory relief in a civil action against a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that deprives persons of federal rights (AR-099-F01; the text names no other plaintiff). Government-enforcement prerequisites, not a private filing deadline: Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a), an Attorney General CRIPA lawsuit under § 1997a ordinarily requires specified written notices at least 49 calendar days before the action and advance investigation notice at least seven days before investigation, with statutory consultation/certification provisions. These procedures govern DOJ's enforcement decision and do not confer a CRIPA private damages cause of action or a right to compel DOJ litigation. Source access: reproduced federal statutory text, not independently authenticated official U.S. Code edition. Who may complain: anyone; the Division receives information from any source. Within scope: systemic conditions at a jail; the county's compliance with the ADA. Not within scope: individual damages; a single incident as such. Remedies: investigation, findings letters, consent decrees, litigation by the United States. Confidentiality: investigative files are not public; findings letters are public. Exhaustion: none; a CRIPA complaint does not affect any private claim. Deadline source: none for the complainant. Official source: Civil Rights Division (Special Litigation Section). Roadmap 099 treats the Civil Rights Division's CRIPA and pattern-or-practice work in depth. Roadmap 048.1 treats how settlements, consent decrees and monitor reports from earlier litigation are read and used as evidence.

K8. California Attorney General

Jurisdiction and roles are set out in Roadmap 093: constitutional chief law officer (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13; Gov. Code §§ 12550, 12560, 12561); supervision of district attorneys and sheriffs; Health Quality Enforcement Section prosecuting licensing accusations (Gov. Code § 12529); civil-rights enforcement under state law (Gov. Code § 12525 and the Civil Rights Enforcement Section); False Claims Act (Gov. Code § 12652); SB 351 and unfair-competition enforcement in the corporate-practice field. Who may complain: anyone; the Attorney General does not represent complainants. What it cannot award: damages to an individual. Official source: Office of the Attorney General (public inquiry and complaint forms by subject).

K9. California Department of Public Health (CDPH)

Jurisdiction: licensing and certification of health facilities under Health & Saf. Code § 1250 et seq. Scope limitation: a county jail infirmary is generally not a licensed health facility, and CDPH does not inspect jails as such. CDPH is the complaint destination for a licensed hospital, skilled-nursing facility, or clinic to which a patient was transferred, and for Health & Safety Code § 1278.5 whistleblower matters as they relate to a licensed facility. Official source: CDPH Licensing and Certification district offices. Roadmap 097 treats CDPH's role alongside the state bodies that oversee local detention health care.

K10. Department of Health Care Services (DHCS)

Jurisdiction: Medi-Cal, including the suspension and reinstatement of Medi-Cal eligibility on incarceration and release, and behavioral-health programs. Included only for eligibility and continuity-of-care questions on release; not a complaint destination for in-custody care quality. Official source: DHCS.

K11. Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC) and county inspection bodies

Jurisdiction: minimum standards for local detention facilities (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 1200, 1202, 1204, 1208.5 opened for Roadmap 031; the balance of Title 15 pending); biennial inspections; the county health officer's inspections and the grand jury's facility inspection authority (Penal Code § 919(b), not opened). Who may complain: anyone; the BSCC receives complaints about facility conditions but has no adjudicatory power over individual claims. Remedies: inspection findings, corrective action plans, public reports. Confidentiality: inspection reports are public records. Deadline: none. Official source: BSCC; the county health officer; the civil grand jury of the county. Roadmap 097 carries the state bodies (the BSCC, Title 15 inspections and county health officers). Roadmap 098 carries the civil grand jury and the other local bodies.

K12. County oversight bodies

Sheriff's civilian oversight commissions and inspectors general exist in some counties by ordinance; their powers vary from subpoena authority to advisory review. Included as a category only; each county's ordinance must be read. Official source: the county. Roadmap 098 treats civil grand juries, sheriff oversight boards, inspectors general and boards of supervisors.

K13. Licensing and labor agencies

Families B, C and D above; listed here to complete the directive's enumeration without duplicating them.

Family L — Bankruptcy and entity complications

Roadmaps 090 and 091 carry this family with debtor-by-debtor precision. The matrix states only the gate.

The gate. Before any claim or complaint is directed at an entity that uses the Wellpath or CFMG name, the reader must identify the exact legal entity and determine from the public docket whether it was a debtor. The public notice of the chapter 11 cases (In re Wellpath Holdings, Inc., No. 24-90533 (ARP) (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), petition date November 11, 2024) lists 39 debtors, including Wellpath CFMG, Inc., No. 24-90556; the name "California Forensic Medical Group, Inc." does not appear in the notice's debtor list; the debtors' own filings describe physician-owned professional corporations managed under management services agreements as non-debtors (Dkts. 15, 17); the plan was confirmed May 1, 2025 and became effective May 9, 2025 (Dkt. 2680); the general bar date was April 7, 2025 and the governmental bar date May 12, 2025 (Dkts. 491, 776); post-effective-date matters are docketed in No. 24-90566; and the H.I.G. opinion (Doc. 956, Nov. 12, 2025) treats derivative claims as estate property released even as to opt-outs.

What the gate asks, for every bankruptcy-related statement. Exact legal entity; debtor or non-debtor; case number; petition date; confirmation and effective dates; discharge (11 U.S.C. § 1141(d), including the conjunctive liquidation/no-business/no-chapter-7-discharge exception under § 1141(d)(3), debtor by debtor); injunction and automatic stay (§ 362(a), including § 362(b)(4) for governmental police-and-regulatory proceedings, with collection/money-judgment limits); pre-petition versus post-petition claim; successor and liquidating-trust issues; insurance (whether a claim may proceed to the extent of insurance, as the plan provides for some claims; Roadmap 091); claims administration; non-debtor releases only where actually ordered, with the consent issue left unresolved by Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. 204 (2024); distinguish independent direct claims against nondebtors from claims belonging to the estate and from post-effective-date acts. Do not presume that every nondebtor claim survives, that any opt-out conclusively establishes/defeats consent, or that a confirmed, substantially consummated plan can be unwound without further authority. Police/regulatory proceedings and post-effective-date conduct require separate statutory and order-specific analysis rather than categorical exemption claims; professional-board proceedings; administrative complaints; post-confirmation conduct.

Who may use the bankruptcy forum. A creditor holding a claim against a debtor (a worker with pre-petition wages; a patient with a pre-petition injury claim); the liquidating trustee; parties in interest. Not a person whose claim runs only against a non-debtor.

Deadline source. The bar date orders (passed); the plan's claims-objection and distribution procedures; 11 U.S.C. § 108 for extension of certain periods (AR-S609). A claim not filed by the bar date is a counsel question with a narrow set of answers.

Official source. The claims agent's public docket (Epiq) and PACER for No. 24-90533 and No. 24-90566.

The matrix at a glance#

Elements of the claim#

This Roadmap has no single claim. Each row's elements are carried by its Roadmap; the claim-by-claim element tables at 096.3 collect them in the directive's five-column form.

Potentially relevant defendants and respondents#

By function, never by brand: the contractor entity that held the county contract; the entity that employed the clinician; the entity that paid the clinician; a professional corporation; the county; the sheriff; the facility; the individual physician, nurse, physician assistant, administrator, health-services administrator or supervisor; the insurer; the bankruptcy debtor; the non-debtor; the successor or liquidating trust. The Entity Identity Worksheet (101) forces each to be identified separately. Never collapse separate entities because they share a name.

Administrative prerequisites#

Collected: EEOC charge (Title VII/ADA, with Fort Bend nonjurisdictional claim-processing qualification); CRD complaint and California right-to-sue notice (FEHA/CFRA, subject to applicable rules); LWDA notice (PAGA where applicable); § 364 notice (qualifying malpractice); Government Claims Act presentation (covered public-entity/employee claims and exceptions); PLRA exhaustion only where the plaintiff is a statutory prisoner bringing a prison-conditions action under § 1983 or another federal law and available remedies exist. ERISA benefits: qualifying § 1132(a)(1)(B) claims ordinarily require plan-internal claims/appeal exhaustion, subject to exceptions and regulatory deemed exhaustion. No one universal administrative filing prerequisite is established here for § 1102.5, § 1278.5, § 2056, Tameny, contract, ordinary wages, FMLA, or regulatory complaints; individual statutes, equitable exceptions, plan provisions and exhaustion defenses remain claim-specific.

Limitation periods#

Every deadline source above is stated by statute and trigger. This Roadmap computes nothing. Five-component statement for the matrix as a whole: Source — the statute named in each row; Period — as the statute states; Trigger — the act, the notice, the accrual, or the rejection, as each statute provides; Tolling — fact-dependent, with the specific provisions named where they exist (Gov. Code § 12965 tolling provisions; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); Code Civ. Proc. § 352.1; § 364(d)); Certainty — Settled as to the periods in the current text; Changing as to Gov. Code § 12960 (2026 amendment) and Code Civ. Proc. § 377.34(b) (sunset); Unsettled as to § 352.1's application to pretrial detention; Fact-dependent as to every accrual question.

Evidence and records to obtain#

The six-way distinction required by the directive governs every forum: (1) records the person already has; (2) records obtainable by statutory request (Roadmap 033; Health & Saf. Code § 123110; UIC § 1094 requests for one's own EDD records); (3) records obtainable only by discovery or subpoena (Roadmap 038; Code Civ. Proc. § 1985.6 for employment records of others); (4) records protected by privilege or privacy (Evid. Code § 1157; § 805 reports; attorney-client; patient records of other patients); (5) records that must be preserved but need not be produced voluntarily (Gov. Code § 12946; 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14; Roadmap 007); (6) records a person must not access, copy or remove (employer systems, patient charts, jail management systems, peer-review files). No forum rewards unlawfully obtained records, and several punish them.

Favorable and adverse facts#

Facts that keep forums open: a timely charge naming the right entity; a grievance filed and appealed through every level; a Government Claims Act claim presented within six months; a written records request with proof of receipt; a § 364 notice served; a proof of claim filed by the bar date; a clear chronology. Facts that close them: a charge against the wrong entity; a lawsuit filed without exhaustion where exhaustion is required; a claim that accrued before the petition date and was not filed in the bankruptcy; a grievance abandoned at the first level without evidence of unavailability; a malpractice suit without expert support.

Likely defenses#

The defense playbook (133) carries the full crosswalk. For the matrix: wrong defendant; no employment relationship; limitations; failure to exhaust; arbitration; bankruptcy discharge or injunction; legitimate business reason; same-decision; no disability or not qualified; no notice; no accommodation available or undue hardship; direct threat; no protected activity or no causation or no knowledge; medical judgment; no deliberate indifference; no policy or custom; isolated incident; no state action; qualified immunity; no duty or breach or causation; expert failure; Government Claims Act bar; PLRA exhaustion; peer-review privilege; litigation privilege; workers' compensation exclusivity; failure to mitigate; real-party-in-interest defects.

Causation#

Each forum has its own causation rule: "because of" in FEHA and the ADA with the Harris mixed-motive framework (Roadmap 013); "contributing factor" and the § 1102.6 burden shift for § 1102.5 (Roadmap 021); the Gordon fourth element and the Farmer standard for constitutional claims; "to a reasonable medical probability" for malpractice (Roadmap 044); the Monell "moving force" requirement for entity liability (Roadmap 047). A forum map cannot substitute for any of them.

Damages and remedies#

The remedies matrix (096.2) carries the directive's categories across forums. For the matrix: back pay, front pay, reinstatement, compensatory and emotional-distress damages, punitive damages (with statutory limits and the Civ. Code § 3294 standard, not opened), statutory penalties, unpaid wages and interest, attorney's fees and costs under fee-shifting statutes, injunctive and declaratory relief, wrongful-death and survival damages, MICRA limits, ERISA remedies, administrative remedies, professional discipline, license restrictions and agency corrective action.

Discovery#

Roadmap 038 (employment) and the correctional discovery pages carry the detail. The matrix notes one structural point: administrative forums have little or no discovery; a Berman hearing, a CRD investigation and a board investigation are agency-driven. Court is where the records that cannot be requested are obtained.

CFMG/Wellpath-specific relevance#

Why this may matter in a CFMG/Wellpath setting. The public record shows a multi-entity organization in which a county contract, an employer of record, a professional corporation and a bankruptcy debtor may be four different juridical persons (Roadmaps 004, 090, 094). A chapter 11 case can affect claims against identified debtors through claim-objection, allowance, discharge, injunction and insurance/settlement mechanisms, but this matrix has not authenticated the operative plan, confirmation order, debtor schedules, releases or post-confirmation orders for each potentially involved legal entity. Do not infer that every professional corporation, owner or other non-debtor either is released or entirely unaffected without testing actual plan text, jurisdiction and controlling law. In that setting, forum choice and entity identity are the same question. A charge, claim or complaint that names the wrong entity may be answered truthfully by the statement that the respondent did not employ the worker or treat the patient; a claim against a debtor filed after the bar date in the wrong forum may be met with the discharge; a governmental licensing-board proceeding may continue under the § 362(b)(4) police-power exception, subject to the precise actor, relief, plan injunction and applicable law; private damages collection is a separate issue. This Roadmap states those structural facts from the public record and states nothing about what any entity did.

Primary authorities#

Opened for this page: Gordon v. County of Orange (9th Cir. 2018) (official host); Estelle v. Gamble, Farmer v. Brennan, Monell, Iqbal, Twombly, West v. Atkins, Richardson v. McKnight (reproduction host, Justia/LII); Ross v. Blake (LII); Tsao v. Desert Palace (official host); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 11 (LII); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (LII); 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (LII); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (eCFR, official); 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (LII); Lab. Code §§ 98, 6310; Civ. Code § 3333.2; Code Civ. Proc. §§ 128.7, 377.30, 377.34, 377.60, 425.10; Bus. & Prof. Code § 2761 (California.Public.Law). Reused: the register entries of Roadmaps 010–033, 037.1, 090–096 as cited in the rows, and 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 14141) — AR-099-F01 (uscode.house.gov). Not opened (flagged): Code Civ. Proc. §§ 352.1, 395, 412.20, 425.13, 430.10, 437c, 474; Gov. Code §§ 845.6, 905, 911.4, 946.6, 950.2; Civ. Code §§ 52.1, 3294; 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4); 18 U.S.C. § 3626; 28 U.S.C. § 1391; 29 U.S.C. § 255; 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730, 3731; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 1395dd, 12132; Penal Code § 919; Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 1600, 2230.5, 3500, 4000; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 3342; Felder v. Casey; Smith v. Wade; Woo v. Superior Court; Wallace v. Kato (R1 verified).

Related roadmaps#

001–009 (foundations); 008 (deadlines); 010–039 (employment); 040–050 (correctional); 090–091 (bankruptcy); 092–096 (regulators and forum map); 097–099 (state, local and federal oversight); 040.1 (juveniles in custody); 048.1 (settlements, consent decrees and monitor reports); 096.2 (remedies matrix); 096.3 (element tables); 002.1 (fact-gateway guidebook); 101 (Entity Identity Worksheet); 125–132 (toolkits and pleading models); 133 (defense playbook).

Companion worksheet#

Forum Screening Worksheet (W-096.1): for each grievance in the chronology, list every row of the matrix that could apply; for each, record the prerequisite and whether it has been satisfied, the deadline source and the trigger date as the records show it (not a computed deadline), the entity named, that entity's debtor status, and the Roadmap that carries the claim. The worksheet collects facts; it does not choose a forum.

What this page cannot do#

It cannot tell a reader where to file, whether a claim exists, which entity is liable, or when any deadline falls. It cannot replace the Roadmap that carries each claim. Several of its rows rest on statutes not yet opened for this page, which are flagged above and in the register and must be verified before publication. It cannot be used as a pleading or as a complaint. And it cannot substitute for counsel, whose job is the choice this page refuses to make.