PLRA Limits: Physical Injury, Attorney's Fees, Screening and Three Strikes

Scope and warning#

This page addresses the PLRA's limits other than exhaustion as they apply to federal civil-rights actions about medical care in California county jails, with California state prisons noted where the law differs. The historical draft drew on the official GovInfo 2023 Code. A bounded October 17, 2026 follow-up compared 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and 18 U.S.C. § 3626 against current Office of the Law Revision Counsel pages displaying laws through Public Law 119-120 (October 7, 2026); directly inspected the published Ninth Circuit opinions in Spencer v. Barajas (2025) and Kelly v. Wengler (2016). The complete 28 U.S.C. § 1915 text was not independently retrieved from current OLRC pages during this follow-up. Historical Ninth Circuit authorities originally read on reproduction hosts retain that access limitation unless expressly upgraded below. Several questions — especially how the limits apply to persons released after filing, and the precise operation of the fee provisions in mixed or partially successful cases — are unsettled or unresearched and are routed to counsel. Nothing here is legal advice, nothing here predicts any court's ruling, and nothing here should be used to draft a filing without counsel.

The factual situation this roadmap addresses#

A generic hypothetical. A 61-year-old man serving a sentence in a California county jail after conviction falls in a shower and reports wrist pain. An X-ray is not taken for three weeks; the fracture heals in a deformed position and he loses grip strength. During the same period he develops severe anxiety and sleeplessness, which he attributes to being told repeatedly that nothing was wrong. He files a federal § 1983 complaint himself, asks to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, and names the county, two jail nurses, a contract physician and the health-care contractor. He has two earlier federal suits: one dismissed for failure to state a claim after he did not amend, and one he voluntarily dismissed. He asks the court for damages, for an order requiring orthopedic surgery, and for an order requiring the jail to adopt an X-ray policy. Four months after filing, he is released, and a lawyer agrees to consider taking the case.

The hypothetical is invented. It raises each limit on this page: the filing-fee installment rules; screening; whether the earlier dismissals are strikes; whether the anxiety claim is barred without physical injury; what fee the lawyer could recover; whether the requested injunctions survive the prospective-relief limits and his release; and whether the release changes anything.

Governing law#

The architecture of the PLRA

The PLRA's provisions are distributed across three titles of the United States Code. Exhaustion, dismissal, attorney's fees, the physical-injury rule, remote hearings and the waiver of reply are in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Filing fees, dismissal of in forma pauperis cases, the three-strikes rule and the definition of "prisoner" for those purposes are in 28 U.S.C. § 1915; screening of prisoner complaints against governmental defendants is in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Limits on injunctions and consent decrees are in 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Each provision has its own trigger, and most turn on whether the plaintiff is a "prisoner." The definitions in § 1915(h), § 1915A(c) and § 1997e(h) are materially identical: each reaches "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility" who is "accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for" violations of criminal law or the terms of parole, probation, pretrial release or diversionary programs (28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), AR-081-F02; § 1915A(c), AR-081-F03; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h), AR-096-F04). The Ninth Circuit reads them as having the same meaning (Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Department of Corrections, No. 15-17123 (9th Cir. May 19, 2017), slip op. at 6–7, AR-080-C11). The definition in § 3626(g) is different and is addressed below. (Grade: Settled — statutory text.)

Screening

Three provisions require courts to dismiss defective prisoner claims, at different stages and for overlapping reasons.

Section 1915A requires the court to review, "before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing," "a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity" or an officer or employee of one, and to identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, that is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or that seeks money from an immune defendant (28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b), AR-081-F03). Section 1915(e)(2) applies to every in forma pauperis case, prisoner or not: "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that" the action "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief" (§ 1915(e)(2), AR-081-F02). And § 1997e(c)(1) requires the court, "on its own motion or on the motion of a party," to dismiss "any action brought with respect to prison conditions" "by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility" "if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious," "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" "or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief" (AR-081-F01); under § 1997e(c)(2), the court may do so "without first requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies" (AR-080-F01). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.)

Three points matter in medical-care cases. First, screening tests the pleading, not the evidence: a screened claim is one that, on its face, states a claim; survival of screening says nothing about whether the claim will succeed. Second, because Jones v. Bock holds that exhaustion is an affirmative defense that need not be pleaded, a complaint is not dismissed at screening merely because it is silent about exhaustion (AR-080-C04; Roadmap 080). Third, § 1915A by its terms reaches complaints seeking redress from a "governmental entity" or its officers or employees. Whether a private health-care contractor and its clinicians are within that phrase when they act under contract with a county is a question this page did not research; but because § 1915(e)(2) applies to every in forma pauperis case regardless of the defendant, a prisoner proceeding without prepayment faces equivalent screening as to all defendants. (Grade on the contractor point: Analytical inference; counsel question.)

Screening timing is tied to filing status. In Olivas, the Ninth Circuit held that § 1915A applies only to a plaintiff who is incarcerated or detained when the complaint is filed; the plaintiff there had been released a month before filing, and the court held that his claims should not have been screened under § 1915A (slip op. at 7, AR-080-C11). (Grade: Settled — Ninth Circuit.)

Filing fees for prisoners

A prisoner may proceed without prepaying the filing fee, but not without paying it. A prisoner seeking in forma pauperis status "shall submit a certified copy of the trust fund account statement" for the six months before filing (28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), AR-081-F02). "[T]he prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee" (§ 1915(b)(1)). The court assesses "an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of" "the average monthly deposits to the prisoner's account" or the average monthly balance over the prior six months, and thereafter the prisoner makes "monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account," forwarded by the custodial agency "each time the amount in the account exceeds $10" (§ 1915(b)(1)–(2)). The statute adds a safeguard: "In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action" because the prisoner has no assets or means to pay the initial partial fee (§ 1915(b)(4)). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.)

A prisoner with several cases pays the 20 percent installment for each case, not once. The Court held that "monthly installment payments, like the initial partial payment, are to be assessed on a per-case basis," because § 1915(b)(2) "calls for simultaneous, not sequential, recoupment of multiple filing fees" (Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82 (2016); AR-081-C05). The fee obligation follows the case even if it is dismissed at screening; a dismissed case is not a refunded case. (Grade: Settled as to the per-case holding; the statement about dismissal at screening is Analytical inference from § 1915(b)(1).)

Three strikes

Section 1915(g) bars in forma pauperis status for a prisoner with a record of qualifying dismissals: "In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action" under § 1915 if, "on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility," the prisoner brought an action or appeal that was "dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," "unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury" (28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), AR-081-F02). The rule does not close the courthouse; it "generally prevents a prisoner from bringing suit in forma pauperis (IFP)—that is, without first paying the filing fee" (Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S. 595 (2020), AR-081-C03). (Grade: Settled.)

The Supreme Court has resolved two recurring questions about what counts. In Lomax, the Court held that the strike provision "refers to any dismissal for failure to state a claim, whether with prejudice or without" (AR-081-C03). In Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015), it held that "A prior dismissal on a statutorily enumerated ground counts as a strike even if the dismissal is the subject of an appeal" (AR-081-C04). (Grade: Settled.)

The Ninth Circuit has insisted that strikes be identified with care. In Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005), it held that defendants challenging in forma pauperis status bear the initial burden: they "must produce documentary evidence that allows the district court to conclude" that the plaintiff has three qualifying dismissals; the prisoner then "must attempt to rebut the defendants' showing" and bears the ultimate burden of persuasion (AR-081-C07). The court defined the grounds — a case is frivolous if it is "of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact," and malicious if filed with the "intention or desire to harm another" — and cautioned that "Not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a strike under § 1915(g)"; the court must evaluate the dismissal order and determine that the action was dismissed on a qualifying ground. A Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal is now decisively resolved: in Spencer v. Barajas, 140 F.4th 1061 (9th Cir. June 6, 2025), the court held it cannot count as a § 1915(g) strike, even when a magistrate judge previously recommended dismissal or found a defective pleading, because a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal is not based on court-decided strike grounds. Spencer expressly reserved successive voluntary dismissals potentially operating as merits adjudications under Rule 41(a)(1)(B), and court-ordered Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals. Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2017), remains adverse authority for failure-to-prosecute orders that follow a failure-to-state-a-claim ruling and an unamended complaint; a Rule 12(b)(1) lack-of-jurisdiction dismissal is not a strike. Dismissals for nonexhaustion and other mixed grounds still demand order-specific evaluation. (Grade: A — official published Ninth Circuit opinion directly inspected; follow-on history not exhaustively checked.)

The imminent-danger exception. In Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit held that "the availability of the exception turns on the conditions a prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed," and that "the exception applies if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced" imminent danger of serious physical injury at that time (AR-081-C06). The court adopted an "ongoing danger" understanding: a prisoner who alleges that officials "continue with a practice that has injured him or others similarly situated in the past" satisfies the imminence requirement, and allegations of exposure to serious communicable disease "more than plausibly raises the specter of serious physical injury." The exception "does not operate on a claim-by-claim basis": where it applies, "the district court must docket the entire complaint and resolve all of its claims." The court expressly left open "the proper treatment of the complaint once it is docketed." For a person with an untreated, worsening medical condition at the time of filing, the exception is the doctrine that matters most. (Grade: Settled — Ninth Circuit.)

The physical-injury requirement

Section 1997e(e) provides: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility," "for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury" "or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of title 18)" (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), AR-096-F04; official text re-read). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.)

The Ninth Circuit's leading construction is Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2002), a pretrial detainee's case (AR-076-C04). The court held, first, that § 1997e(e) "requires a prior showing of physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis." On the facts — back and leg pain from conditions in temporary cells, which the plaintiff described as "nothing too serious" and for which he did not seek treatment; unspecified injuries from a fight; and a canker sore for which he received treatment — the court found the injuries "not more than de minimis." Second, and of greater importance in medical cases, the court held that "§ 1997e(e) applies only to claims for mental and emotional injury": claims for compensatory, nominal or punitive damages premised on the constitutional violation itself, "and not on emotional or mental distress," are not barred. (Grade: Settled — Ninth Circuit.)

In a custody medical case the requirement ordinarily has limited bite, because the injury complained of — a worsened fracture, a delayed diagnosis, ketoacidosis, sepsis, a death — is itself physical. It matters at the margins: where the physical consequence of a delay is minor and the principal harm claimed is fear, anxiety or distress; where the claim is for distress caused by being denied care for a condition that resolved without lasting physical harm; or where a defendant argues that the physical injury was not caused by the conduct of which the distress claim complains. The statute requires a "prior showing" of physical injury, not that the distress be caused by it; how closely the two must be connected is a question on which this page did not open controlling authority. (Grade: Analytical inference as to application; counsel question as to the connection requirement.)

Attorney's fees

Section 1988(b) authorizes fees in § 1983 actions: "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States," "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs," and § 1988(c) allows the court to "include expert fees as part of the attorney's fee," but only in actions "to enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this title," not in § 1983 actions (42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)–(c), AR-081-F05; R1 AR-S922, pending). For prisoners, § 1997e(d) overlays three limits (AR-081-F01). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.)

Which actions. The fee limits apply "In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility" "in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 1988" (§ 1997e(d)(1)).

What fees. Fees may be awarded only to the extent "the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights" "protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988," and either "the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation" or "the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation" (§ 1997e(d)(1)(A)–(B)).

The judgment offset and the 150 percent rule. Where a monetary judgment is awarded in such an action, "a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent)" "shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant"; "If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment," "the excess shall be paid by the defendant" (§ 1997e(d)(2)). The Supreme Court resolved the first sentence in Murphy v. Smith, No. 16-1067 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2018): "[D]istrict courts must apply as much of the judgment as necessary, up to 25%, to satisfy an award of attorney's fees"; the court has no discretion to choose a smaller percentage (AR-076-C05). The Ninth Circuit has binding, more precise guidance: Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2016), citing Jimenez v. Franklin, 680 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2012), treats the total fee associated with a monetary judgment as limited to 150 percent of that judgment, while expressly stating the limitation does not apply to actions, or portions of actions, securing nonmonetary relief. Kelly also holds that an appropriately supported lodestar enhancement is not categorically barred for nonmonetary-relief fees; that does not waive the statute's rate and hours controls. Murphy separately requires application of as much as 25% of the damages judgment as needed to satisfy awarded fees. The allocation of work in a mixed-relief case remains fact-specific. (Grade: A — directly inspected published Ninth Circuit opinion and OLRC statutory text; later case history not exhaustively checked.)

The hourly rate. No award may be based on an hourly rate greater than "150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A" of title 18 for court-appointed criminal defense counsel (§ 1997e(d)(3)). The § 3006A rate is set administratively and changes; this page states no figure. Under Kelly, the cap limits the base hourly rate used to calculate the lodestar; in properly supported circumstances an enhancement for factors not already subsumed may be available, particularly where the work secures nonmonetary relief. This is not a general power to bypass the 150%-of-damages fee-award limitation.

Private agreements. "Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a prisoner from entering into an agreement to pay an attorney's fee" "in an amount greater than the amount authorized under this subsection" "if the fee is paid by the individual rather than by the defendant" (§ 1997e(d)(4)). A contingency agreement is therefore permitted; what it may not do is shift the excess to the defendant. (Grade: Settled — statutory text. Whether California's limits on contingency fees in professional-negligence actions against health-care providers, Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146 (R1 AR-S912), affect a mixed case is a counsel question.)

Other procedural provisions

Section 1997e(f)(1) directs that, "To the extent practicable, in any action brought with respect to prison conditions in Federal court," "pretrial proceedings in which the prisoner's participation is required or permitted" "shall be conducted by telephone, video conference, or other telecommunications technology." Section 1997e(g) allows a defendant to "waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner"; the waiver "shall not constitute an admission of the allegations contained in the complaint," but "No relief shall be granted to the plaintiff unless a reply has been filed," and the court "may require any defendant to reply" "if it finds that the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits" (AR-081-F01). An order requiring a reply is often the first sign that a screened claim will proceed. (Grade: Settled — statutory text.)

Who is a "prisoner," and when it is measured#

Every limit on this page except § 1915(e)(2) and the § 3626 rules depends on whether the plaintiff is a "prisoner," and the Ninth Circuit measures that status when the action is filed. This Roadmap uses role vocabulary — patient, detainee, prisoner, personal representative, successor in interest, heir, decedent's estate — because each role is treated differently.

At filing. Through Olivas, the Ninth Circuit has restated Page v. Torrey's rule that the PLRA definitions reach "only individuals who, at the time they seek to file their civil actions, are detained" as a result of accusation, conviction or sentence for a criminal offense (slip op. at 6, AR-080-C11; Page not opened). Olivas applied the rule to § 1915A screening. Jackson v. Fong applied it to exhaustion and fixed the moment at the filing of the operative complaint (AR-080-C08; Roadmap 080). (Grade: Settled — Ninth Circuit, for those provisions.)

Release after filing. The statutory language for the fee limits — "any action brought by a prisoner who is confined" (§ 1997e(d)(1)) — and for the physical-injury rule — "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined" (§ 1997e(e)) — looks to the time the action is brought. A plaintiff who files while confined and is later released is, on that reading, still within those limits for that action; a plaintiff who files after release is not. Whether an amended complaint filed after release changes the analysis for these provisions, as Jackson held it does for exhaustion, is a question this page did not find resolved and routes to counsel. (Grade: Analytical inference from the text; Unsettled/split as to amended pleadings outside exhaustion.)

Three strikes after release. Section 1915(g) bars a "prisoner" from bringing an action in forma pauperis; a person who is not a prisoner when filing is not within it, though prior dismissals "while incarcerated or detained" remain on the record if the person is later confined again. (Grade: Analytical inference from the text and the Olivas/Page definition.)

Heirs, estates and successors. A wrongful-death claim by heirs in their own right, and a survival claim brought by a personal representative or successor in interest, are brought by persons who are not "incarcerated or detained." On the statutory text, those plaintiffs are outside § 1997e(d), § 1997e(e), § 1915A and § 1915(g). This page did not open appellate authority on the point; it is graded Analytical inference and listed as a counsel question. The decedent's own physical injury will usually be undisputed in a death case, so § 1997e(e) rarely matters there in any event.

Civil detainees. Page held that a civilly committed person is not a "prisoner" under the § 1915 and § 1997e definitions (as described in Olivas). A person held in a county jail on a civil hold, rather than on a criminal charge or sentence, requires individual analysis. (Grade: Settled — Ninth Circuit, as described.)

Prospective relief: 18 U.S.C. § 3626 and Brown v. Plata#

A request for an injunction about ongoing medical care — an order to provide a referral, a surgery or a medication, or to change a policy — is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3626, which uses its own definitions. "Prospective relief" means "all relief other than compensatory monetary damages"; "prisoner" means "any person subject to incarceration, detention, or admission to any facility," including persons accused or convicted or on parole, probation or pretrial release; "prison" means "any Federal, State, or local facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults" accused or convicted of criminal violations (§ 3626(g), AR-081-F04). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.)

The need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirement. Prospective relief "shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs," and the court may not grant it unless it finds that the relief is "narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right," and is the least intrusive means necessary; the court must give "substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system" (§ 3626(a)(1)(A)). An order requiring a specific surgery for a specific plaintiff is easier to fit within those words than an order requiring a county to adopt a system-wide imaging policy, which must be tied to a violation of the plaintiff's own rights. (Grade: Settled — statutory text; application — Analytical inference.)

Preliminary relief. "Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically expire on the date that is 90 days after its entry," unless the court makes the required findings and makes the order final before then (§ 3626(a)(2)). An emergency order for medical care therefore needs to be followed by findings or by a final order, or it lapses by operation of law.

Prisoner release orders. A court may not enter a prisoner release order unless a less intrusive order has failed and the defendant has had a reasonable time to comply; such orders may be entered only by a three-judge court, which must find "by clear and convincing evidence that" "crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right" and that "no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right" (§ 3626(a)(3); as quoted in Brown v. Plata). The Supreme Court affirmed such an order in Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), a case about medical and mental-health care in California's state prisons (AR-057-C06). The Court wrote that "A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible" with the concept of human dignity, and that "Courts may not allow constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion" into prison administration — while holding the relief to the PLRA's requirements that it be "narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary … , and is the least intrusive means necessary." Plata is the reference point for system-wide relief; it is rarely the model for an individual's case. (Grade: Settled.)

Termination and stay. Prospective relief may be terminated on motion at times the statute specifies, including "2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief" (§ 3626(b)(1)(A)), and a motion to modify or terminate "shall operate as a stay" for the period the statute sets (§ 3626(e)(2)). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.)

Release and mootness. A claim for an injunction about jail medical care generally depends on the plaintiff remaining subject to the jail's care; release ordinarily raises a mootness question for individual injunctive claims, and Roadmap 096.2 notes it as a counsel question. Damages claims are not affected by release in that way. (Grade: Majority/likely; authority not opened.)

How the limits interact in a medical-care case#

Read together, the limits sort custody medical claims into recognizable categories.

A claim for serious physical harm from delayed or denied care, brought by a person still in custody, will be screened, will carry installment filing fees, will be subject to the three-strikes rule if the person has qualifying dismissals (with the imminent-danger exception available if the medical danger is ongoing at filing), will not usually be affected by § 1997e(e), and — if counsel takes it and wins — will carry fee limits that may make representation uneconomic where damages are modest; however, attorney work reasonably attributed to genuinely obtained nonmonetary relief is not subject to the monetary-judgment 150% cap under Kelly. The fee limits bear directly on whether counsel can afford to take such a claim, which helps explain why many such claims are filed by self-represented prisoners — an observation, not a measured fact (Analytical inference).

The same claim, filed by the same person after release, is outside § 1915A screening (Olivas), outside the exhaustion requirement (Jackson), and, on the statutory text, outside § 1997e(d) and (e) and § 1915(g); § 1915(e)(2) still applies if the person proceeds in forma pauperis. The trade-off is time: the limitation period runs regardless of custody status, subject only to whatever tolling California law provides (Roadmap 082).

A death case brought by heirs or a successor in interest is, on the statutory text, outside all of the "prisoner" limits; its constraints are the Government Claims Act for state-law claims against public entities (Roadmap 078), the limitation and survival rules (Roadmaps 065, 082), and, where an entity in the Wellpath corporate family is involved, the bankruptcy gate (Roadmaps 090, 091).

A claim for emotional distress alone — fear while waiting for care that, in the end, was provided without lasting physical harm — is the category § 1997e(e) was written for, subject to Oliver's holding that nominal and punitive damages and damages for the constitutional violation itself remain available.

Applying the law to the hypothetical#

The man in the hypothetical is a "prisoner" when he files. His complaint will be screened under § 1915A as to the county and its employees and under § 1915(e)(2) as to all defendants, including the contractor and its physician; the screening will ask whether he has pleaded facts plausibly showing each defendant's deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment standard that applies to a sentenced person (Roadmap 043) and a policy or custom as to each entity (Roadmap 047). He will owe the full filing fee in installments.

His earlier suits must be evaluated before he files. Under Lomax, the court-ordered dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a strike regardless of prejudice, assuming the relevant action or appeal was brought while the plaintiff was detained. If the other lawsuit was dismissed by a valid Rule 41(a)(1) notice, Spencer v. Barajas means that dismissal is not a strike; if it was instead court-ordered under Rule 41(a)(2), or involved successive notices under Rule 41(a)(1)(B), Spencer reserved those questions and its operative papers must be reviewed. On the stipulated two-case history alone, three established strikes have not been shown; a complete federal docket search remains necessary. If he had three, the question would be whether, at filing, he plausibly alleged an ongoing danger of serious physical injury (Andrews v. Cervantes) — a malunited fracture causing weakness may or may not qualify; an untreated, progressing condition is the stronger case.

His wrist injury is physical and more than de minimis, so § 1997e(e) does not bar his claim for distress connected to it; even if it did, Oliver preserves nominal and punitive damages and damages for the violation itself. His request for an orthopedic surgery order must satisfy § 3626(a)(1)(A) and, if preliminary, lapses at 90 days without findings; his request for a jail-wide X-ray policy must be tied to a violation of his own rights. His release four months after filing likely moots his injunctive requests and does not, on the statutory text, take his action outside the fee limits, because it was "brought by a prisoner who is confined." Whether an amended complaint filed after release would change that is a question for counsel. The lawyer considering the case must evaluate it with the § 1997e(d) limits in view.

A step-by-step approach#

1. Fix the plaintiff's role and custody status at the anticipated filing date. Identify who will sue and whether that plaintiff will be a "prisoner" under § 1915(h), § 1915A(c) and § 1997e(h) when the complaint is filed (Olivas; Jackson). Record custody dates from documents.
2. Collect every prior federal filing. Case numbers, complaints, orders, judgments, appeals, docket entries and any Rule 41(a)(1) notices. Evaluate grounds and procedural posture under Lomax, Coleman, Andrews v. King, Harris v. Mangum and Spencer v. Barajas before treating any prior case as a strike; the latter holds Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissals are not strikes, while reserving specified other voluntary-dismissal forms.
3. If there are three qualifying dismissals, assess imminent danger at filing. Document the ongoing medical condition and the continuing practice alleged (Andrews v. Cervantes). Do not allege a fact unless you have a good-faith factual basis for it.
4. Assemble the trust-account statement if in forma pauperis status will be sought (§ 1915(a)(2)), and understand that the fee is owed in full in installments, per case (Bruce).
5. Plead to survive screening. State facts, not conclusions, about each defendant's knowledge and conduct and each entity's policy or custom (Roadmaps 045, 047, 130). Exhaustion need not be pleaded (Jones v. Bock), but an accurate description can avoid an early motion (Roadmap 080).
6. Identify the physical injury. Describe the physical consequences of the delay or denial with records; separate claims for distress from claims for the violation itself and for physical harm (Oliver).
7. Frame any injunction narrowly. Tie it to the plaintiff's own rights and the specific care needed (§ 3626(a)(1)(A)); calendar the 90-day expiry of any preliminary order (§ 3626(a)(2)).
8. Address fees at the outset. If counsel will appear, the engagement agreement must account for § 1997e(d)(1)–(4) and, for any professional-negligence claim, California's fee limits (Roadmap 096.2).
9. Keep parallel tracks separate. The Government Claims Act (Roadmap 078), the § 364 notice (Roadmap 066), limitation periods (Roadmap 082) and the bankruptcy gate (Roadmaps 090, 091) are unaffected by anything on this page.

Elements of the claim#

The PLRA limits are not elements of a § 1983 claim; the elements are in Roadmaps 042, 043, 045 and 047. Each limit has its own conditions, which the party invoking it must show:

• Screening dismissal: the plaintiff is a prisoner (§ 1915A) or proceeding in forma pauperis (§ 1915(e)(2)); the complaint, or a claim, is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks money from an immune defendant.
• Three strikes: the plaintiff is a prisoner seeking in forma pauperis status; three or more prior actions or appeals brought while incarcerated or detained were dismissed on an enumerated ground (Lomax; Coleman), shown by documentary evidence (Andrews v. King) with Rule 41(a)(1) notices excluded as strikes (Spencer v. Barajas); and the complaint does not plausibly allege imminent danger of serious physical injury at filing (Andrews v. Cervantes).
• Physical-injury bar: the action was brought by a confined prisoner; it seeks damages for mental or emotional injury suffered in custody; and there is no prior showing of more-than-de-minimis physical injury or a sexual act (§ 1997e(e); Oliver).
• Fee limits: the action was brought by a confined prisoner; fees are authorized under § 1988; and the § 1997e(d) conditions apply to the award (Murphy).
• Prospective-relief limits: the action is a civil action with respect to prison conditions and seeks relief other than compensatory damages (§ 3626(g)).

Potentially relevant defendants#

The limits do not depend on which defendant is sued, with one exception: § 1915A screening reaches claims against a "governmental entity" and its officers and employees, while § 1915(e)(2) reaches all defendants in an in forma pauperis case. By role and function, the defendants in a custody medical case are individual clinicians and nurses (Roadmap 045), custody staff, supervisors, the county (Roadmap 047), and a private health-care contractor and its affiliates (Roadmaps 003, 004, 046, 047). Qualified-immunity arguments, which differ for public employees and for private contractors' employees, are in Roadmap 077. No defendant is liable because of its role in a contract.

Administrative prerequisites#

Exhaustion of available grievance remedies for a prisoner's federal claims (Roadmap 080); presentation of a government claim for state-law claims against public entities and employees (Gov. Code §§ 911.2, 945.4; AR-096-S01, AR-096-S02; Roadmap 078), which is not required for § 1983 claims (Williams v. Horvath, AR-C08); the § 364 notice for professional-negligence claims against health-care providers (AR-096-S04; Roadmap 066). The limits on this page are not prerequisites; they operate after filing.

Limitation periods#

None of the PLRA provisions on this page is a limitation period. The table identifies the time-related sources that bear on a prisoner's federal medical-care action; it computes nothing.

Evidence and records to obtain#

Records key: H — presently has lawfully; R — statutory request; D — discovery or subpoena only; P — potentially privileged or private; K — someone else must preserve but need not produce voluntarily (Roadmap 007); X — must not access, copy or remove.

• The person's prior federal filings, dismissal orders and docket sheets — H, or public court records obtainable from the court (PACER) — R in the practical sense of a public request.
• The certified trust-account statement for the six months before filing — R (from the custodial agency, as § 1915(a)(2) contemplates).
• Custody records fixing booking, sentencing, transfer and release dates — H (release papers) or R/D.
• The person's own medical records documenting the physical injury — R (Health & Saf. Code § 123110; Roadmap 083).
• Imaging, orthopedic or specialist records from outside providers — R (own records) or D.
• Records of the ongoing condition at the time of filing (for imminent danger) — H/R.
• Jail policies on imaging, referrals and specialty care (for injunctive relief) — R (Public Records Act, Roadmap 087) and D.
• Contractor quality and peer-review files — D and possibly P (Evid. Code § 1157, AR-032-S04; Roadmap 085).
• Fee and engagement records — P (attorney-client).
• Jail and contractor electronic systems and other patients' records — X.

Favorable and adverse facts#

Facts that tend to help the plaintiff on these limits: filing after release (where consistent with the limitation period); no prior qualifying dismissals; an ongoing, documented danger of serious physical injury at filing; a documented physical injury that is more than de minimis; claims framed for the violation itself and for physical harm; a narrowly framed injunction tied to the plaintiff's own care; a plaintiff who is an heir or successor rather than a prisoner.

Facts that tend to help defendants: three or more court-determined qualifying prior dismissals documented by orders (including Harris v. Mangum scenarios, but excluding valid Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissals under Spencer); no allegation of present danger at filing; injuries that are transient or minor; a claim that seeks damages only for fear or distress; an injunction request reaching beyond the plaintiff's own rights; release that moots injunctive relief while leaving the fee limits in place; a pleading of conclusions rather than facts.

Likely defenses#

Defendants will invoke the limits as motions or objections: a motion to revoke in forma pauperis status under § 1915(g) with the prior dismissal orders and relevant docket entries attached (Andrews v. King), subject to Spencer's Rule 41(a)(1) exclusion and possible Harris v. Mangum failure-to-amend strike; a motion to dismiss or for judgment on § 1997e(e) grounds as to distress damages (Oliver); opposition to injunctive relief under § 3626(a)(1)(A); motions to terminate under § 3626(b); fee opposition under § 1997e(d) and Murphy; and mootness after release. Roadmap 133 states these claim by claim. Qualified immunity and other individual defenses are in Roadmap 077; procedural barriers generally in Roadmap 089.

The deep companions to Roadmap 133 for these defenses are Playbooks 138 (the physical-injury rule and the PLRA fee limits) and 134 (pleading attacks).

Causation#

Section 1997e(e) raises a causal question: the plaintiff must make a "prior showing of physical injury," and a defendant may argue that the claimed distress is not connected to the physical injury shown. Section 1997e(d)(1)(A) raises another: fees must have been "directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation." And imminent danger asks whether a continuing practice threatens serious physical injury. Medical causation — whether the delay caused the physical harm — is in Roadmap 075.

Damages and remedies#

The PLRA limits recovery in four ways: covered distress-damages claims require physical injury or a qualifying sexual act (§ 1997e(e)); fee awards are constrained by hours, base rate and monetary/nonmonetary relief allocation (§ 1997e(d); Kelly); up to 25% of a prisoner's damages judgment is compulsorily applied toward eligible awarded fees (Murphy); and covered prospective relief is narrowly constrained and terminable (§ 3626). Nominal and punitive damages and damages for the violation itself survive § 1997e(e) (Oliver). Punitive damages against individual defendants, the bar on punitive damages against counties, and the remedies in each forum are in Roadmaps 076 and 096.2.

Discovery#

The PLRA limits on this page are decided largely on court records (prior dismissals), custody records (status at filing), medical records (physical injury) and fee records. Discovery into a defendant's policies matters most for injunctive relief, where the scope of a § 3626 order must be tied to the violation found. Discovery tools and protections are in Roadmaps 084 and 085, and the method in Roadmap 038.

CFMG/Wellpath-specific relevance#

Why this may matter in a CFMG/Wellpath setting. Public records describe a model in which counties contract with private entities to provide jail health services (Roadmaps 003, 004, 086). In that model two of this page's questions take a particular form: whether § 1915A screening, which reaches claims against a "governmental entity" and its officers and employees, extends to a private contractor and its clinicians (a counsel question; § 1915(e)(2) applies regardless in an in forma pauperis case); and whether an injunction about medical care must run against the county, the contractor, or both, which depends on the contract's allocation of responsibility, obtainable as a public record (Roadmaps 086, 087). Entity precision is required: the historical source-A register identifies California Forensic Medical Group, Inc. and Wellpath CFMG, Inc. as distinct entities and assigns bankruptcy source markers AR-B071, AR-B12 and AR-B01 to their reported status and docket identifiers. This update did not independently authenticate the latest debtor schedules, plan, confirmation order, surviving claims or appellate/postconfirmation developments and does not promote these historical assertions into judicial findings. An adverse-party analysis must verify the exact contracting/employing/legal person, the debtor’s legal name and case, claim type and accrual date, applicable plan injunction, exceptions and nondebtor treatment before characterizing exposure. Never infer liability or protection from shared branding. References to historical source-A Roadmaps 090/091 are held cross-references, not verified source-B canonical links. Nothing here states that any entity caused any injury or is liable for any fee, damages or injunctive relief.

Primary authorities#

Related roadmaps#

041, 042, 043, 045, 046, 047, 065, 066, 075, 076, 077, 078, 080, 082, 083, 084, 085, 086, 087, 089, 090, 091, 096.2, 112, 130, 133

Companion worksheet#

Worksheet 112 (damages and mitigation) should separate physical injuries, with records, from claims for distress, and record whether each claimed loss depends on the physical injury. Worksheet 100 (chronology) should carry custody status at each anticipated filing date. Worksheet 109 (custody, medical, grievance and emergency records) holds the medical records that document the physical injury. A litigation-history table — case number, court, filing date, custody status at filing, each amendment, Rule 41 notice or court dismissal order, dismissal date, stated ground, appeal status and whether Spencer or Harris v. Mangum governs — is needed for any person with prior federal filings. The dedicated companion is Worksheet 121 (Grievance and Exhaustion Record Worksheet).

What this page cannot do#

It cannot say whether any person is a "prisoner" for any provision, whether any prior dismissal is a strike, whether any injury is more than de minimis, whether any danger is imminent, what fee any court would award, or whether any injunction would be granted or survive release. It cannot decide when anyone should file. It explains the limits so that the facts that decide them — custody status, litigation history, physical injury, and the scope of relief sought — can be documented before a filing is made.