Limitation Periods and Tolling for Incarcerated Plaintiffs

Scope and warning#

This page addresses limitation periods and tolling for claims arising from medical care in California jails and prisons: § 1983 claims, state-law claims against public entities and employees, professional-negligence claims against private health-care providers, and wrongful-death and survival claims. It builds on Roadmap 008, which introduced the five components of every deadline, and on Roadmap 078, which addresses the Government Claims Act in depth; late-claim relief is in Roadmap 079. It does not address bankruptcy timing, which is in Roadmaps 090 and 091.

Private October 17, 2026 source-control note: This is the complete historical source-A body with a separately reversible, noncanonical correction overlay. Relevant case opinions were rechecked below against official Ninth Circuit files or published-opinion reproductions; the California statutory text remains reproduction-grade, not authenticated directly from the current Legislature-hosted code. Only specified propositions have been rechecked; subsequent-history/citator, individual applicability, all competing source-B manuscript identities, and external legal/privacy/editorial approval remain open. Numbers 079–099, 100–124 and 125–150 and their internal links refer to historical source A only until body-by-body comparison, not to established publication destinations. The absence of 090–091 from a competing index is an omission, not a demonstrated collision. Every rule has exceptions requiring counsel's case-specific evaluation.

The factual situation this roadmap addresses#

A generic hypothetical. A 34-year-old man is arrested and held pretrial in a California county jail. Over ten days he submits sick-call requests describing a swollen, discolored leg and fever. He is seen by a nurse employed by the county and later by a physician employed by a private company that provides health services under contract with the county. He is transferred to a hospital on the eleventh day, where the leg is amputated below the knee. He remains in the jail pretrial for seven more months, pleads guilty, and is sentenced to state prison for a term of years, where he remains. His mother asks what time limits apply to claims against the county, the deputies and nurse, the private company and its physician, and whether his custody pauses any of them. In a variant of the hypothetical, he dies in the hospital, leaving his mother and a minor daughter.

The hypothetical is invented. It places the accrual of the claims during pretrial detention, which is where California's custody-tolling law is least settled, and it involves public and private defendants, which is where the tolling rules diverge most sharply.

Governing law#

Section 1983 borrows the state period and state tolling, but accrual is federal

Section 1983 has no limitation period of its own. The Supreme Court has held that the period "is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts," but that the accrual date "is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law" (Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), Part II; R1 AR-C07). As to tolling, "We have generally referred to state law for tolling rules, just as we have for the length of statutes of limitation" (id., Part III). In Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989), the Court applied a State's tolling rule for prisoners to a § 1983 claim, explaining that limitation periods are determined by reference to the "state statute of limitations and the coordinate tolling rules" (490 U.S. at 539), and that a prisoner tolling provision "does not frustrate § 1983's compensation goal" and is "consistent with § 1983's remedial purpose" (id. at 543–544; AR-082-C07). The Ninth Circuit applies the forum state's personal-injury limitation period "along with the forum state's law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling," "except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law" (Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); AR-082-C01), and "we borrow no more than necessary" (TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1999), quoting West v. Conrail; AR-082-C08). The statutory foundation for borrowing state law where federal law is deficient is 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a), which applies state law "so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States" (AR-081-F05). (Grade: Settled.)

California's personal-injury period is Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1: "Within two years: An action for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual" "caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another" (AR-010-S02; official text registered; re-read on a reproduction host). That period is borrowed for § 1983 claims arising in California. (Grade: Settled.)

Federal accrual. A § 1983 claim accrues "when the plaintiff has 'a complete and present cause of action'" — when "the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief" (Wallace, Part II). In the Ninth Circuit, "a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury" which is the basis of the action (TwoRivers). For a medical-care claim, the injury is often known when it occurs — an amputation, a stroke, a hospitalization — but a delayed diagnosis can present a real question about when the person knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the care received. Accrual is frequently the most contested question in a limitations dispute (Roadmap 008). (Grade: Settled as to the rule; application fact-dependent.)

State-law claims against public entities and public employees

A state-law damages claim against a county — for negligence, for failure to summon medical care under the Government Code, or for wrongful death — ordinarily requires a written government claim presented within the statutory period, and suit within the period that follows its rejection (Gov. Code §§ 911.2, 945.4, 945.6(a); AR-096-S01, AR-096-S02, AR-096-S03; Roadmap 078). The claim requirement does not apply to § 1983 claims (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834; AR-C08). These periods are not in Chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the general tolling statutes expressly exclude them, as the next sections explain. (Grade: Settled.)

Professional negligence against health-care providers

Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5 governs actions against a "health care provider" for "professional negligence," defined as "a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider" in rendering professional services that proximately causes personal injury or wrongful death, within the scope of the provider's license (AR-069-S06; R1 AR-S602). The period is three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first; "In no event shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled" for three listed reasons — "upon proof of fraud," "intentional concealment," or "the presence of a foreign body, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect." Minors have a separate rule: "Actions by a minor shall be commenced within three years from the date of the alleged wrongful act," with a longer period for a minor "under the full age of six years." A 90-day notice of intention to sue is required by Code Civ. Proc. § 364, and service of the notice near the end of the period extends it as that section provides (AR-096-S04; Roadmap 066). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.) Whether a private correctional health contractor's clinician is a "public employee" for Government Claims Act purposes is addressed in Roadmap 079; this page treats the private provider as outside the claim-presentation requirement only as an Analytical inference to be confirmed there.

Wrongful death and survival

A wrongful-death action under Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60 (AR-065-S08) is brought by the heirs in their own right; its period is § 335.1's period for an action "for the death of" an individual, or § 340.5's where the death is attributed to professional negligence of a health-care provider (whose definition of professional negligence includes negligence that proximately causes personal injury or wrongful death). A survival action under § 377.30 (AR-0961-S06) continues the decedent's own claim; if a person entitled to sue "dies before the expiration of the applicable limitations period," and the claim survives, an action may be commenced before the later of "Six months after the person's death" or "The limitations period that would have been applicable if the person had not died" (Code Civ. Proc. § 366.1; R1 AR-S606). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.) The interplay of these periods with a § 1983 death claim, and the roles of personal representative, successor in interest and heir, are in Roadmap 065.

Custody tolling: Code Civ. Proc. § 352.1 and the pretrial-detention conflict#

The text

Section 352.1(a): "If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 335)," "is, at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge," "or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than for life," "the time of that disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action," "not to exceed two years" (R1 AR-S603; re-read on a reproduction host). Subdivision (b): "This section does not apply to an action against a public entity or public employee" "upon a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented" under the Government Claims Act. Subdivision (c): "This section does not apply to an action, other than an action to recover damages" "or that portion of an action that is for the recovery of damages, relating to the conditions of confinement," "including an action brought by that person pursuant to Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code." (Grade: Settled — statutory text.)

Five consequences follow directly from the text, before any case law. First, the disability must exist "at the time the cause of action accrued"; custody that begins after accrual does not trigger the statute. Second, the tolling is capped at two years; it suspends the running of the period during the disability, up to that cap, and does not add a fixed period to the end. Third, life without possibility of parole is ordinarily outside the judicial construction of the statute, but a life sentence with possibility of parole is not categorically excluded; the published California decision Brooks v. Mercy Hospital (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1 applied § 352.1 to a parole-eligible life sentence, following Grasso. Eligibility still depends on qualifying custody at accrual and the other statutory restrictions. Fourth, the statute does not reach state-law claims against counties and county employees that require a government claim — which is most state-law claims against a county jail's own staff. Fifth, for a § 1983 action about conditions of confinement — which includes medical care — it tolls only the damages portion; claims for injunctive or declaratory relief get no tolling. Because § 1983 claims do not require a government claim (Williams v. Horvath), subdivision (b) does not exclude them, and § 352.1 can apply to the damages portion of a § 1983 action against a county or its employees if the custody element is met. (Grade: Settled as to the text; the application to § 1983 is Majority/likely, consistent with Hardin and Wallace.)

Parole-eligible life sentences: Brooks

Brooks v. Mercy Hospital (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1, a published California Court of Appeal medical-care case, followed Grasso v. McDonough Power Equipment (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 597 and held that § 352.1 can protect a person serving a life sentence with a possibility of parole. It reversed dismissal where the trial court treated every life sentence as excluded. A life sentence without the possibility of parole is materially different. For each prospective litigant, retrieve the actual sentencing abstract, parole terms, custody location, date of accrual and operative version of the statute; no additional tolling time is assumed. Source grading: published controlling California appellate authority reviewed in full on a reproduction host, not authenticated against an official appellate PDF; complete subsequent-history review open.

Medical negligence: Belton

In Belton v. Bowers Ambulance Service (1999) 20 Cal.4th 928, the California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's holding, which it quoted, that "A prisoner's time to sue a health care provider can be extended by incarceration" (id. at 930; AR-066-C03). The plaintiff, "an inmate in a federal prison," sued an ambulance company that had transported him from the prison to a hospital. The court held that § 352.1 may extend the one-year discovery period of § 340.5, because the "in no event" sentence of § 340.5 — which permits only fraud, concealment and foreign-body tolling — "applies only to the three-year maximum" (id. at 932). But the court was equally clear that "No tolling provision outside of MICRA can extend the three-year maximum time period" (id. at 931). For a professional-negligence claim against a private health-care provider, then, custody tolling, where it applies, can affect the one-year period but not the three-year outside limit. (Grade: Settled.)

Who is "imprisoned on a criminal charge": the conflict

The application of § 352.1 to a person held pretrial in a county jail is unresolved. The R1 register carries the conflict (AR-S603; AR-C49 through AR-C53), and this page restates it with the sources opened today.

Elliott. Applying the predecessor statute, former Code Civ. Proc. § 352(a)(3), the Ninth Circuit held in Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994), that "actual, uninterrupted incarceration is the touchstone" for tolling, and that this touchstone "covers all post-arrest custody"; its footnote 5 states that "pre-trial detainees clearly are 'imprisoned' within the meaning of the California statute" (R1 AR-C49; re-read on OpenJurist this session). (Grade: binding on federal courts in the Ninth Circuit unless displaced — but contested; see below.)

Austin. In Austin v. Medicis (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 577, the published California Court of Appeal opinion held that incarceration in the Los Angeles County Jail before trial did not qualify under current § 352.1, reasoning that the statute applies when a claimant is serving a term in state prison. Austin expressly regarded Elliott's interpretation of former § 352 as unpersuasive because the Ninth Circuit had not had the later legislative history of § 352.1. The complete opinion was reviewed via a judicial-opinion reproduction in this pass; its binding relevance to California trial courts is more than merely a secondary description, although statewide later-history and federal Erie application require counsel review. (Grade: published California appellate precedent; current conflict with earlier published Ninth Circuit treatment remains material.)

Later federal treatment. In an unpublished memorandum that "is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3," a Ninth Circuit panel applied Austin to hold that a one-day county-jail detention did not qualify, reading the phrase, with Austin, to mean "serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison"; the memorandum does not mention Elliott (Shaw v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, No. 18-17184 (9th Cir. June 23, 2020); R1 AR-C51; re-read on the court's site this session). Some federal district courts have continued to apply Elliott: Frias v. County of San Diego, No. 3:22-cv-00675-JO-AHG (S.D. Cal., Nov. 29, 2023, ECF 68), expressly considered the pretrial issue and declined to displace Elliott with Austin. That district ruling is not circuit precedent and its subsequent history was not independently citator-checked. Earlier Price v. Yeramishyn remains description-only. Thus a live adverse interpretation must be assessed in the precise forum and custody setting. The R1 register's targeted search on 2 October 2026 found no published Ninth Circuit or California Supreme Court decision resolving the tension, and recorded that the search was not comprehensive; this page found none in the sources it opened. (Grade: Unsettled/split.)

Three practical consequences follow. First, a federal court and a state court may answer the question differently for the same person. Second, a claim that accrued while the person was in pretrial custody may not be tolled even if the person was later sentenced to state prison, because the statute looks to status "at the time the cause of action accrued." Third, the only safe planning assumption is that pretrial custody adds no time.

Civil detainees

In Jones v. Blanas, the Ninth Circuit held that § 352.1's literal language — "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than for life" — did not cover a person civilly detained under California's sexually violent predator law (393 F.3d at 927; AR-082-C01). It held instead that California's equitable-tolling doctrine "operates to toll a statute of limitations for a claim asserted by a continuously confined civil detainee who has pursued his claim in good faith" (id. at 930), and remanded. Jones is also the source of the principle that civilly detained persons "are entitled to more considerate treatment" than criminal detainees (id. at 931, quoting Youngberg), which the R1 register records at AR-C46. (Grade: Settled — Ninth Circuit.)

Government claims and state prisoners

Because § 352.1(b) excludes claims that require a government claim, the Government Code supplies its own rule for persons in state prison. Gov. Code § 945.6(b): "When a person is unable to commence a suit on a cause of action described in subdivision (a)" "within the time prescribed in that subdivision because he has been sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison," "the time limit for the commencement of such suit is extended to six months after the date that the civil right" "to commence such action is restored to such person," "except that the time shall not be extended if the public entity establishes that the plaintiff failed to make" "a reasonable effort to commence the suit, or to obtain a restoration of his civil right to do so," "before the expiration of the time prescribed in subdivision (a)." Subdivision (c): "A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may not commence a suit on a cause of action" "described in subdivision (a) unless he presented a claim" under the Government Claims Act (AR-078-S24). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.) Two features limit its reach. It applies only to persons "sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison," not to pretrial detainees or to persons serving sentences in county jail. And it is premised on the person being "unable to commence a suit" because of the sentence; whether, and when, a state prisoner lacks the civil right to sue under current Penal Code provisions is a question this page did not research (Penal Code provisions not opened; counsel question). Nothing in § 945.6(b) extends the time to present the government claim itself.

Minority, incapacity, death and equitable tolling#

Minority and lack of capacity

Code Civ. Proc. § 352(a): "If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 335) is," "at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of majority or lacking the legal capacity to make decisions," "the time of the disability is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." Subdivision (b): "This section shall not apply to an action against a public entity or public employee upon a cause of action" "for which a claim is required to be presented" under the Government Claims Act (AR-082-S01). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.) As with § 352.1, the disability must exist at accrual, and claims requiring a government claim are excluded. A person who lacked decision-making capacity at the time of a custody medical injury — because of a brain injury, a psychotic illness, or an encephalopathy that was itself part of the medical event — may have a § 352 argument for claims outside the Government Claims Act; whether a given condition meets the statute's standard is a fact question requiring medical evidence. For professional-negligence claims, § 340.5's own minors rule and its three-year outside limit must be read with § 352; the interaction is a counsel question. Whether a minor heir's minority tolls a wrongful-death claim is also a counsel question this page did not research.

Incapacity and death in the government-claim process

The Government Code treats incapacity and death within the late-claim process rather than by tolling. In computing the one-year outside period for an application to present a late claim, "The time during which the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss as a minor shall be counted," "but the time during which he or she is mentally incapacitated and does not have a guardian or conservator" "of his or her person shall not be counted" (Gov. Code § 911.4(c)(1); R1 AR-S503; re-read this session). And the public entity's board must grant a timely late-claim application where the claimant "was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in Section 911.2" (with a separate rule for incapacity during part of it), where the claimant was a minor, where the failure was "through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" and the entity was not prejudiced, or where the person "died before the expiration of the time specified in Section 911.2" (Gov. Code § 911.6(b); AR-079-S01). The board must act "within 45 days after it is presented," and the application "shall be deemed to have been denied on the 45th day" absent action or agreed extension (§ 911.6(a), (c)). (Grade: Settled — statutory text.) Late-claim relief, including court petitions, is in Roadmap 079.

Equitable tolling

California's equitable-tolling doctrine "is a judicially created, nonstatutory doctrine" "designed to prevent unjust and technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits" (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, slip op. at 5–6, the second phrase quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.; AR-082-C03). It applies "[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one" (id., quoting Elkins), and it "may extend even to the voluntary pursuit of alternate remedies" (id. at 8). Its three elements are "timely notice, and lack of prejudice, to the defendant, and reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff" (id. at 10, quoting Addison). Federal courts borrow it for § 1983 claims (Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d at 927). (Grade: Settled.) Equitable tolling is fact-intensive and is decided after the fact; it is a ground on which a late filing may be saved, not a basis for planning to file late. Whether pursuing a jail grievance, a medical-board complaint, or a government claim against one defendant equitably tolls the period against another defendant depends on the notice that defendant received.

Tolling during grievance exhaustion

For prisoners subject to mandatory available-remedy exhaustion under the PLRA, the Ninth Circuit recognized tolling during the required administrative process in Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2005) (AR-080-C13; Roadmap 080). Record when the grievance was delivered, received, accepted, appealed and finally exhausted, rather than treating an asserted grievance period as automatically proven. The relevant federal § 1983 borrowing and tolling analysis must be distinguished from California's separate Government Claims Act presentation deadlines; Brown does not, by itself, toll the latter. (Grade: published Ninth Circuit exhaustion precedent; entity/date/application review still required.)

New September 28, 2026 published Ninth Circuit development — state-specific limitation: In Edwards v. Brown, No. 25-6849 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2026), the court held that Oregon Revised Statutes § 12.210 tolled a prisoner's § 1983 limitation period while the PLRA prevented suit during exhaustion of available administrative remedies. The opinion holds that tolling commenced no later than initiation of the grievance process and expressly left unresolved whether tolling also begins at injury/accrual before the grievance starts. The court resolved an Oregon statutory-tolling issue, not the California interpretation of §§ 352.1 or 945.3; it did not decide federal equitable-tolling entitlement under California law. Do not transpose Oregon § 12.210 as a California statutory rule or announce that Edwards replaced Brown. (Grade: published Ninth Circuit opinion, official court PDF directly reviewed; California-law application not adjudicated.)

Accrual problems: delayed discovery, wrongful death and pending criminal charges#

Delayed discovery under California law

For state-law claims, "the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements" is the general accrual point, but the discovery rule postpones accrual "until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action"; a plaintiff has reason to discover when he or she "has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements" (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, slip op. at 6, the first and third phrases quoting Norgart v. Upjohn Co.; AR-082-C04). Plaintiffs are "charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury" when they have "information of circumstances to put [them] on inquiry" (id. at 8, the second phrase quoting Gutierrez v. Mofid). A plaintiff relying on delayed discovery must plead "the time and manner of discovery" and "the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence" (id. at 9, quoting McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc.). (Grade: Settled.) Do not allege a fact unless you have a good-faith factual basis for it — and that applies with special force to the date and manner of discovery, which will be tested against medical records, grievance filings and the person's own statements.

The discovery standard is suspicion, not certainty. A plaintiff discovers a claim when he "suspects ... that someone has done something wrong" to him (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397, quoting Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.; AR-082-C05). A person who believed at the time that the delay in care was wrong may have "discovered" the claim then, whatever the later medical opinions say. For professional negligence, § 340.5's one-year period runs from discovery of the injury, subject to the three-year outside limit.

Wrongful death

"[A]t least as a usual matter, the date of accrual of a cause of action for wrongful death is the date of death" (Norgart, 21 Cal.4th at 404). The California Supreme Court in Norgart assumed, "for purposes of discussion only," that "the discovery rule may govern the date of accrual of a cause of action for wrongful death" (id.). (Grade: Settled as to the general rule; application of the discovery rule to wrongful death — Majority/likely at most, on Norgart's assumption.) Families sometimes learn the circumstances of a death in custody only months later, through a coroner's report, a records request or public reporting (Roadmap 064). Whether that delay affects accrual under the discovery rule is a fact question; it does not affect the government-claim period's computation except through the late-claim provisions.

Pending criminal charges

Two rules address the overlap of a civil claim with criminal proceedings.

Heck and Wallace. A § 1983 plaintiff seeking "to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment," or for harm whose unlawfulness would render a conviction invalid, must show that the conviction "has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order," or otherwise invalidated; such a claim "does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated" (Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–487, 490 (1994); AR-082-C06). But if the action "will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff," it should proceed (id. at 487). And Wallace rejected the argument that "an action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that conviction occurs," calling it a "bizarre extension of Heck" (Wallace, Part III). A claim about medical care in custody ordinarily does not call a conviction into question, so Heck ordinarily does not delay its accrual; and a pending prosecution does not delay accrual of a § 1983 claim at all. (Grade: Settled as to the rules; their application to medical-care claims is Analytical inference — at description level here; procedural barriers are in Roadmap 089.)

Government Code § 945.3. California law bars a person charged by accusatory pleading from suing a peace officer or the officer's employing public entity "for money or damages" based on the officer's conduct relating to the charged offense "while the charges against the accused are pending before a superior court," and provides that "Any applicable statute of limitations for filing and prosecuting these actions shall be tolled" "during the period that the charges are pending before a superior court" (Gov. Code § 945.3; AR-078-S23). Pending charges "do not include appeals" or diverted proceedings. The section does not prevent a government claim from being filed and "shall not extend the time within which a claim is required to be presented pursuant to Section 911.2." Its scope is limited to peace officers' conduct relating to the charged offense; whether any part of a custody medical claim relates to the charged offense is fact-dependent and, for most medical-care claims, doubtful. Federal § 1983 tolling is now researched and cannot be left categorically open: In published Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2020), the Ninth Circuit held § 945.3's tolling provision applied to an otherwise time-barred § 1983 Monell claim against a county where the claim was predicated on peace officers' conduct relating to the charged offense while criminal charges were pending; the underlying officer conduct was indispensable to that claim. The court relied on preexisting federal borrowing rules, not a new federal accrual date. Earlier Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1989), limits § 945.3's state-law bar on filing: it cannot prohibit filing a federal § 1983 action in federal court, even though applicable state-law tolling may benefit the federal claim. Lockett does not hold that all jail medical-care claims receive criminal-charge tolling; charged offense, officer conduct, defendant and causal relationship require independent proof. Section 945.3 expressly does not extend the § 911.2 government-claim presentation deadline. (Grade: official published Ninth Circuit opinion directly reviewed; controlling for the specific holding, no case-specific application certified.)

Applying the law to the hypothetical#

The man's claims accrued during pretrial detention — at the latest when the leg was amputated and he knew of the injury and its connection to the delay (TwoRivers; Fox). Each family of claims must then be analyzed separately.

His § 1983 claims against the deputies, the county nurse, the county, the contract physician and the private company borrow § 335.1's period. Whether § 352.1 suspends it depends on whether he was "imprisoned on a criminal charge" when the claims accrued — the Elliott/Austin conflict — and the later state-prison sentence does not answer that question, because the statute looks to status at accrual. If mandatory, available PLRA administrative remedies were properly pursued, the exhaustion-tolling issue requires proof of each procedural step under Brown v. Valoff; Edwards v. Brown (Sept. 28, 2026) is specifically an Oregon-statutory-tolling case and supplies no extra California period. Separately, § 945.3 could affect a related officer-conduct § 1983 claim under Lockett only if pending criminal charges and the statutory relationship are documented; a stand-alone allegation of delayed medical care is not enough. Equitable tolling is possible but cannot be planned on. Any injunctive claim gets no § 352.1 tolling under subdivision (c).

His state-law claims against the county and its employees require a government claim within the § 911.2 period, with late-claim relief under §§ 911.4 and 911.6 — including the incapacity grounds if he was incapacitated during his hospitalization and recovery. Section 352.1 does not apply to them (subd. (b)). Section 945.6(b) applies only to persons sentenced to state prison and only if they were unable to sue because of the sentence; it does not extend the claim-presentation period.

His professional-negligence claims against the private physician and company are governed by § 340.5 and § 364. If § 352.1 applies, Belton allows it to affect the one-year discovery period but not the three-year maximum. Whether he qualifies again turns on the pretrial-detention conflict.

In the death variant, the wrongful-death claims of his mother and daughter accrue at death (Norgart) and run under § 335.1 or, as to professional negligence, § 340.5; the survival claim runs under § 366.1's later-of rule; state-law claims against the county still require a government claim. Whether the daughter's minority affects any period is a counsel question. None of this computes a date; every trigger must be fixed from documents.

A step-by-step approach#

1. List every potential claim and every potential defendant. One row per claim per defendant: § 1983 (individual; entity), state negligence against the county, professional negligence against the private provider, wrongful death, survival (Worksheet 100; Roadmap 008).
2. Fix custody status and parole eligibility at each candidate accrual date. Document booking, arraignment, conviction, sentence, whether any life term carries possibility of parole, transfer, and release — because § 352.1 looks to the status when the claim accrued and Brooks forbids treating every parole-eligible life term as excluded.
3. Identify the candidate trigger for each row. Injury; discovery (with the document that shows it); death; government-claim rejection notice. Record the date of each document and the date of receipt separately.
4. Identify the shortest clock. Usually the government-claim period for claims against a county; act on it first (Roadmap 078).
5. Identify each distinct statutory or equitable tolling question and grade it. Custody (§ 352.1, including Brooks and the Elliott/Austin split), minority/incapacity (§ 352), mandatory grievance exhaustion (Brown; Edwards only as a non-California statutory example), equitable tolling (McDonald), charged-offense/peace-officer relationship and pending superior-court charges (§ 945.3; Lockett), and death (§ 366.1). Separate federal accrual from state-derived tolling; neither pending prosecution nor an unfinished grievance automatically creates extra time.
6. Serve required notices. The § 364 notice for professional-negligence claims (Roadmap 066); the government claim (Roadmap 131).
7. Plead accrual and discovery facts accurately. Fox requires the time and manner of discovery to be pleaded where delayed discovery is relied on. Do not allege a fact unless you have a good-faith factual basis for it.
8. Check the entity gate. Before naming any entity in the Wellpath corporate family, check Roadmaps 090/091.
9. Do not calculate alone. Have counsel determine any date; this series computes none.

Elements of the claim#

Limitation is an affirmative defense, not an element. A defendant raising it must ordinarily show the applicable period, the accrual date, and filing after the period ran; the plaintiff may respond with delayed discovery (with the pleading burden Fox describes), statutory tolling (§§ 352, 352.1; Gov. Code § 945.3), equitable tolling (McDonald's three elements), tolling during exhaustion (Brown v. Valoff), or the survival rule of § 366.1. The elements of the underlying claims are in Roadmaps 042, 043, 045, 047, 065 and 066, and the element tables are in Roadmap 096.3.

Potentially relevant defendants#

Limitation rules differ by defendant role. A county and its employees: § 1983 claims borrow § 335.1 and may be tolled by § 352.1; state-law claims require a government claim and are excluded from §§ 352 and 352.1 (Roadmap 078). A private health-care contractor and its clinicians: § 1983 claims as above; professional-negligence claims under § 340.5 with Belton's rule and the § 364 notice; whether any Government Claims Act requirement applies to them is addressed in Roadmap 079. Peace officers and their public employer: § 945.3 may restrict state-law damages actions and toll qualifying claims based on officer conduct tied to pending charged offenses; for federal § 1983, the state statute cannot block federal filing but its tolling component can apply (Harding; Lockett), including some derivative Monell claims, not all healthcare contractor disputes. No defendant is liable because a period has not run.

Administrative prerequisites#

A government claim for state-law damages claims against public entities and employees (Gov. Code §§ 911.2, 945.4; AR-096-S01, AR-096-S02); for persons sentenced to state prison, Gov. Code § 945.6(c) restates that a claim must have been presented before suit. The § 364 notice for professional negligence (AR-096-S04). PLRA exhaustion for federal claims by persons who are prisoners when they sue (Roadmap 080). None of these is a substitute for another.

Limitation periods#

Each column identifies sources and triggers only. No column computes a date, and no row states any reader's deadline.

Evidence and records to obtain#

Records key: H — presently has lawfully; R — statutory request; D — discovery or subpoena only; P — potentially privileged or private; K — someone else must preserve but need not produce voluntarily (Roadmap 007); X — must not access, copy or remove.

• Booking, arraignment, conviction, sentencing, parole eligibility/life-with-possibility-of-parole status, transfer and release documents fixing custody status at accrual — H (person's papers), R (obtainable court records and releasable sheriff's records), or D (lawful discovery). A life sentence alone is insufficient to declare tolling unavailable under Brooks.
• Criminal docket showing when charges were pending before a superior court (for § 945.3) — R (public court records).
• The person's own medical records fixing the date of injury and the information given about its cause — R (Health & Saf. Code § 123110; Roadmap 083); after death, by the personal representative — R.
• The person's dated grievance initiation and submission, institutional receipt stamps, return-for-correction notices, appeals, final exhaustion response and grievance policies — H (lawfully retained), R (lawfully requestable own records), or D. Separate a signed draft from verified delivery: compare Edwards' fact-specific initiation evidence; document Brown exhaustion and distinguish California from Oregon law.
• Government claims, late-claim applications, rejection notices and envelopes or proof of mailing — H.
• The § 364 notice and proof of service — H.
• Letters, messages and statements by the person about the event (which may fix discovery) — H; communications with counsel — P.
• Death certificate, coroner's report and hospital death records — R (Roadmap 064).
• Medical evidence of incapacity during the relevant periods (for § 352 and §§ 911.4, 911.6) — R or D.
• Contractor and county internal reviews of the event — D, possibly P (Evid. Code § 1157, AR-032-S04; Roadmap 085).
• Jail and contractor electronic systems and other patients' records — X.

Favorable and adverse facts#

Facts that tend to support timeliness: filing within the shortest untolled period; a government claim presented promptly, with proof; documents showing that the injury or its connection to the care was not reasonably discoverable until a later date; continuous custody beginning before accrual, with custody that clearly qualifies (a state-prison sentence in effect at accrual); documented incapacity at accrual; a grievance process pursued to completion; pending charges in superior court relating to a peace officer's conduct; death before the period ran (§ 366.1).

Facts that tend to support the defense: contemporaneous statements, grievances or messages showing early suspicion (Norgart; Fox); reliance on § 352.1 for pretrial detention (Austin, disputed in federal court); reliance on §§ 352 or 352.1 for state claims requiring government presentation; a life-without-parole sentence rather than a parole-eligible one (Brooks); custody beginning only after accrual; failure to present the government claim to the proper entity; a grievance that was never properly initiated/exhausted; an unproven charged-offense nexus for § 945.3 (Lockett); and reliance on equitable tolling without statutory or factual support. A bare statement that someone has a 'life sentence' is not itself enough to defeat § 352.1.

Likely defenses#

Statute of limitations, raised by demurrer or motion to dismiss where the bar appears on the face of the complaint and otherwise by summary judgment; failure to present a timely government claim (Roadmap 078); inapplicability of § 352.1 to pretrial detention (Austin; unpublished Shaw) versus the continuing Elliott federal issue; an erroneously asserted life-sentence exclusion contradicted by Brooks if parole is possible; § 352.1(b) exclusion of state claims requiring a government claim; disputed mandatory exhaustion dates and any Edwards-to-California statutory transfer; absence of the § 945.3 charged-offense/peace-officer nexus despite the published Lockett holding; the three-year maximum of § 340.5 (Belton); inquiry notice defeating delayed discovery (Fox; Norgart); absence of the elements of equitable tolling (McDonald). Roadmap 133 states the strongest version of each defense and the facts that weaken it.

The deep companion to Roadmap 133 for these defenses is Playbook 136 (limitations, accrual and tolling).

Causation#

Limitation law has no causation element, but causation shapes accrual. A claim may not accrue until the person knows or has reason to know of the injury (TwoRivers) and, under California's discovery rule, has reason to suspect a factual basis for its elements, including that the injury was caused by someone's wrongdoing (Fox; Norgart). In a delayed-diagnosis case, when the person learned that the delay — rather than the disease — caused the harm can be decisive. Medical causation itself is in Roadmap 075.

Damages and remedies#

A time-barred claim yields no remedy, however strong its merits. Section 352.1(c) also shapes remedies: for conditions-of-confinement actions, custody tolling extends only the damages portion, so an injunctive or declaratory claim that would otherwise have been timely by virtue of tolling is not. Survival claims carry the damages limits of Code Civ. Proc. § 377.34 (AR-065-S07). Remedies across forums are in Roadmap 096.2; damages in custody medical cases in Roadmap 076.

Discovery#

Limitation disputes turn on dates: what the person knew and when, custody status on particular days, and when notices were sent and received. Discovery directed to those facts includes the person's own statements and grievances (which the defense will seek), the custody record, the medical record's documentation of what the person was told, and the public entity's claim file. The tools are in Roadmaps 084 and 038.

CFMG/Wellpath-specific relevance#

Why this may matter in a CFMG/Wellpath setting. Public records describe a model in which counties contract with private entities to provide jail health services (Roadmaps 003, 004, 086). In that model the same event can produce claims against a public entity — subject to the Government Claims Act and excluded from §§ 352 and 352.1 tolling — and claims against a private provider and its clinicians — subject to § 340.5, § 364 and Belton's rule — so the limitation analysis must be done defendant by defendant, from the county contract and the employment records that identify who employed each clinician (Roadmaps 086, 087, 094). Entity precision is required: California Forensic Medical Group, Inc. is a California professional corporation that does not appear among the debtors in the Wellpath Chapter 11 cases (AR-B071), while Wellpath CFMG, Inc. is a debtor, Case No. 24-90556 (AR-B12), in the cases jointly administered under No. 24-90533 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.) (AR-B01). Bankruptcy can suspend or extend some periods and bar others, and historic bar dates are not recurring limitation periods (Roadmap 008); check Roadmaps 090/091 before suing any Wellpath debtor entity. Liability is never inferred from branding. Nothing here states that any entity caused any injury or that any claim against any entity is timely or untimely.

Primary authorities#

Related roadmaps#

006, 007, 008, 041, 042, 043, 045, 047, 064, 065, 066, 075, 076, 078, 079, 080, 081, 083, 084, 086, 087, 089, 090, 091, 094, 096.2, 096.3, 100, 111, 131, 133

Companion worksheet#

Worksheet 100 (chronology) is the primary companion: add columns for custody status (pretrial, sentenced to county jail, sentenced to state prison, released) on each date, and for the date of each document and its receipt. Worksheet 111 (death in custody) carries the death-related triggers and the roles of personal representative, successor in interest and heirs. Worksheet 114 (preservation and records distinction) carries the preservation demands. A limitation worksheet with one row per claim per defendant — source, candidate trigger and its document, prerequisite and its date, tolling issue and its grade, unresolved factual question, and no "final deadline" cell unless counsel has determined it — is described in Roadmap 008. The dedicated companion is Worksheet 120 (Claim, Notice and Limitation-Source Tracker — sources and documents only, no computed dates).

What this page cannot do#

It cannot tell anyone when a claim accrued, whether any tolling rule applies to them, or when any period ends; it computes no date. It cannot resolve the conflict over § 352.1 and pretrial detention, predict how any court would decide it, or say whether equitable tolling or delayed discovery would be found on any facts. It identifies the sources, the triggers and the open questions so that counsel can be consulted while every option remains open.